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Abstract 
The “World’s Greatest Deliberative Body” and the Decision to Invade Iraq: The Rhetoric of 
Senatorial Debate on S.J.Res. 46. 
 
by 
Henry Russell Castillo 
Dr. David Henry, Examination Committee Chair 
Chair and Sanford Berman Professor 
Department of Communication Studies 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas 
 
 On the issue of the Iraq invasion in 2003, many in the public view President George W. 
Bush as the primary actor in its execution. Yet Bush explicitly sought congressional approval 
before employing military force. In doing so, he elevated Congress’ role in the Iraq crisis. A 
plethora of academic research exists on how Bush attempted to persuade the public that invading 
Iraq was the correct choice. However, a dearth of scholarship exists on how Congress, 
specifically the Senate, deliberated on this decision. As a chamber often labeled the “World’s 
Greatest Deliberative Body,” the Senate carries constitutionally-unique responsibilities in matters 
of foreign affairs. The 107th Senate and the debate on the 2002 Iraq resolution constitute the 
focus of this thesis. Often viewed by scholars as highly influential in foreign policy matters, the 
Senate only dedicated five days to debate one of the most expansive military authorizations in 
recent American history. A close textual analysis of Senate speeches, selected from the 
Congressional Record, was conducted so as to trace the arguments that the Senators made. This 
analysis yielded three metaphorical clusters that help illuminate the Senators’ speech structure: 
FORCE, TIME, and STATUS. As federal representatives of the American public, it is crucial to 
understand how our Senators argued, and ultimately passed, a momentous resolution costing 
more than one-and-a-half trillion dollars and having become the third longest war in American 
history.  
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Chapter One: Introducing the Senate’s Debate 
 On the evening of September 11, 2001, a few hours following the terrorist attacks on the 
World Trade Centers in New York City, President George W. Bush proclaimed from Barksdale 
Air Force Base, “Make no mistake, the United States will hunt down and punish those 
responsible for these cowardly acts.”1 He reinforced and extended these remarks from the Oval 
Office later that same day, where he said, “The search is underway for those who are behind 
these evil acts. I’ve directed the full resources of our intelligence and law enforcement 
communities to find those responsible and to bring them to justice. We will make no distinction 
between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor them.”2 Here, Bush 
articulated what would ultimately shape the beginning of his “War on Terror” campaign. 
Broadly, his administration sought to dismantle Osama Bin Laden’s Islamic Al-Qaeda 
organization in Afghanistan and dismantle Saddam Hussein’s support for terrorism in Iraq.3 
While Congress quickly authorized the President to invade Afghanistan three days after the 9/11 
terrorist attacks, 13 months later he was also authorized to invade Iraq. On October 11th, 2002, 
nine days after its formal introduction in Congress, the “Authorization for Use of Military Force 
Against Iraq Resolution of 2002” was passed. President George W. Bush signed the legislation 
into law on October 16th.4 Broadly, the resolution allowed Bush to attack preemptively a country 
that allegedly harbored Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) under the despotic rule of Saddam 
Hussein.  
 Despite the difference in time between the two authorizations, political discussions 
concerning the Iraq decision took place well before its passage. Shortly after the September 11, 
2001 terrorist attacks in New York City, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and other top 
White House officials were already discussing the possibility of invading Iraq.5 Although Bush’s 
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remarks on the day of the attacks were significant, nine days later on September 20, 2001, the 
president delivered a widely watched speech to a joint-session of Congress. After this address, a 
coalition of pro-invasion members of Congress began forming and Bush’s nascent “War on 
Terror” quickly became popular.6 As rhetorical scholar Herbert W. Simons chronicled in his 
rhetorical review of the Iraq invasion, “In subsequent speeches Bush would continue to capitalize 
on the appeal of his antiterrorist rhetoric, finding new enemies and new rationales for aggressive 
action.”7 Despite the problematic reasoning used to justify military force, Bush’s persuasive 
campaign was largely successful. In 2002, the president enjoyed astronomical approval ratings.8 
By 2004, public opinion polls indicated that a majority of Americans still believed in the now 
refuted link between the terrorist group Al-Qaeda and Iraq that was often suggested by White 
House officials.9 
 Media coverage leading up to the invasion aided Bush’s post-9/11 rhetoric. As president, 
his remarks on Iraq were heavily televised between 2002 and 2004.10 However, news coverage 
on Congressional deliberation was markedly low; comments or speeches by those who opposed 
the war, primarily Democrats, received even less attention.11 Juxtaposing these two pieces of 
data highlights the unequal concentration of coverage between the Congressional debates and 
Bush’s speeches. Although consensus was needed from both branches of government to invade 
Iraq, the formal arguments forwarded by Congress were sidelined by news reports in comparison 
to the president’s statements on the question of whether to invade Iraq. While it is not surprising 
that presidential rhetoric receives considerable attention due to the office’s prestige and power, 
the discursive dimensions of Congressional deliberation should not be overlooked. Despite Bush 
receiving the burden of the Iraq crisis, we should not forget the Senate’s instrumental role in 
passing one of the most expansive military authorizations in recent American history. 
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 Despite such importance, the scarce coverage on how senators debated the resolution is 
alarming in general and the lacking media coverage of opposing senators is noteworthy in 
particular. Although various factors influence media exposure, the data presented above signify 
an object of study that should provoke greater scrutiny: texts from the senatorial debate on Iraq. 
Why? Presidential rhetoric, which is routinely studied by critics, often shapes and/or is shaped by 
Congressional rhetoric.12 To ignore or sideline the arguments made by senators would overlook 
the political effects that the Senate has on the executive branch and vice-versa. This thesis thus 
investigates these texts to understand better the rhetorical implications stemming from the 
debate. 
 The purpose of this chapter is to address three objectives. First, prior literature salient to 
the thesis’ direction is reviewed, documented, and explained. The significance of surveying past 
research lies in its capacity to generate new criticism, as well as to demonstrate the distinct and 
novel qualities of the proposed rhetorical experience.13 This section is broken up into two areas: 
Analyses of American political argumentation and rhetorical research on senatorial deliberation. 
Attention then turns to a succinct orientation to the Senate’s constitutionally unique qualities as 
the primary legislative body on foreign policy. Lastly, the project’s analytical framework is 
offered and explicated.  
Literature Review 
 To explore specific congressional debates warrants a broad study in political and public 
argumentation. Understanding how past rhetorical research has analyzed U.S. foreign policy 
rhetoric and public deliberation can aid in critiquing the Iraq invasion. Addressing these pertinent 
areas of scholarship calls for two sub-sections: One entailing public deliberation studies within a 
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rhetorical framework and one including a narrower scope of American-led war and/or crisis 
studies. 
 Critic John Murphy claims that, “political speech calls up its authority from the depths of 
the past even as it reaches out for the symbolic charge of contemporary culture.”14 Rhetorical 
deliberation is a democratic and symbolic expression; it is an ideal that, as Robert Ivie maintains, 
“is a needed measure of shared symbolic space . . . .”15 Ivie proposes a hierarchical system of 
God and devil terms in which terms, like ‘human rights,’ possess the most value.16 He details 
that before “freedom” or “democracy” can occur, second-order terms like “law” and “order” 
must first be obtained. The freedom to speak publicly for or against, and as well as engage in 
public debate, is intrinsic to the acquisition and preservation of other national goals. American 
leaders regularly employ these terms during war. Ivie offers Harry Truman’s use of the phrase 
“the rule of law” as an exemplar.17 Truman argued that maintaining a sense of formal order was 
instrumental to democracy.18 The discussion of God and devil terms, as Ivie explains, also 
necessitates a discussion of metaphor. The strategic manipulation of certain words and phrases to 
achieve an end is a powerful linguistic force, one that is innately metaphorical and central to 
American foreign policy rhetoric. As Ivie asserts, “Nowhere is the temptation to literalize a 
fertile metaphor any stronger or more consequential than in deliberations about war and peace.”19  
 The use of metaphor has historically punctuated U.S. political discourse. As literary 
devices intended to persuade, metaphors are common rhetorical tactics employed by American 
presidents, politicians, and public rhetors. Pro-war Republicans employed metaphors to justify 
the War of 1812 against Britain. The war, declared on June 18th of 1812, was the culmination of 
years of tensions and unresolved issues that remained following the American Revolutionary 
War. Republicans charged the British as a persistent, barbaric, pervasive entity that was trying to 
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re-colonize America.20 Decivilizing vehicles, affirmation of threatening expectations, the 
suggestion of rational demonstrations, and the subversion of competing perspectives were 
metaphors used by Republicans to advocate for war against Britain.21 These metaphors helped 
portray foreign adversaries of insidious or antagonistic motives. Subversion of competing 
perspectives, for example, relies on the premise that the world is constantly changing and 
evolving. This view pressured actors to “ . . . [adapt] to new realities that were beyond their 
power to influence rather than delude themselves.”22 Instead of seeking peace, Republicans 
argued that war opponents offered perspectives or viewpoints that were out-of-date and thus 
faulty. Britain was a hostile enemy and to entertain other perspectives would be costly. This type 
of metaphor, then, prioritizes a particular view on an international crisis or situation while also 
projecting any competing theory as deleterious.  
 Robert Ivie explains that the defining power of presidential rhetoric can influence 
Congressional rhetoric.23 Following the September 11th terrorist attacks and after Bush’s address 
to a joint session of Congress on September 20th, 2001, Ivie observed that, “One Republican 
member of the U.S. House of Representatives, Steve Buyer from Indiana, was sufficiently 
moved by the apocalyptic overtones of the president’s rhetoric to suggest that such 
circumstances could warrant even the use of ‘tactical nuclear devices’ to ‘close [Osama bin 
Laden’s] caves for a thousand years.’”24 Ivie’s claim suggests that the rhetorical association 
between presidents and Congress during crises may influence each other. This connection is 
significant in that it can illuminate how congressional arguments take shape.  
 In her careful study of George W. Bush’s speeches in the few months preceding Iraq’s 
2003 invasion, Kathleen Hall Jamieson argues that the president’s use of evidence to justify the 
invasion was more linguistically fearful than realistically truthful.25 Being confident that Saddam 
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Hussein harbored Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), Bush’s word choices were often 
reused by Congress on the campaign trail and in floor statements, as well as by media pundits, to 
emphasize further the urgency behind the resolution’s swift passage.26 Jamieson’s analysis is 
valuable in understanding how certain speakers crafted their arguments during the 2002 Iraq 
resolution debates by repeating and extending the President’s ideas. Bryan Taylor adds to 
Jamieson’s research by claiming that the presidential rhetoric surrounding nuclear war typically 
draws from a reservoir of easily repeatable ideas and phrases.27 News reporters, politicians, and 
the general public then repeat these phrases.28 As Taylor maintained, these ideas are “ . . . 
[borrowed] and varied by Republican supporters, questioned by rank-and-file Democratic 
opponents, and picked over by Democratic leaders caught in the middle.”29 Together, Jamieson’s 
and Taylor’s works illustrate how words, ideas, and themes expressed by a president can be 
recycled in future political debates. Understanding how politicians reuse different aspects of a 
president’s speech(es) can inform critics on how Congress members construct and support their 
arguments during deliberations. As Taylor argued, “Congressional debate strategically deploys, 
vigorously contests, or slyly appropriates presidential policy articulation through intertextual 
reference to presidential argument as public acts and telling reasons in the debate.”30  
 The Gulf War crisis of 1990-1991 mirrors much of the rhetorical tactics employed by 
politicians in the War of 1812 that Ivie articulates. Drawing from the 1991 publication of the 
Congressional Record, scholars James Voss, Joel Kennet, Jennifer Wiley, and Tonya Schooler 
examined the most frequent metaphors senators used on the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.31 
Metaphorical language was employed by pro-war Republicans to portray Iraq as a savage enemy 
and a serious threat not only to Kuwait, but to other countries as well. Senator William Roth (R – 
DE) stated, “His [Hussein’s] intentions are clear—intentions that pose a direct threat not only to 
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the security of our country but to the world at large.”32 While this quote is literal, it helps Roth 
set up his next statement: “[Saddam Hussein] is a glutton for territory. . . .”33 
Roth spoke of Hussein projected the despotic leader as a greedy enemy. Roth’s use of the 
“ENEMY” metaphor helped simplify Roth’s arguments so as to  “induce a sharing of premises 
with an audience.”34 Voss, Kennet, Wiley, and Schooler concluded that the Senator’s arguments 
reinforced “the image of Iraq as an enemy, and metaphor was a means to do this.”35 Of the 756 
metaphors that the authors identified, portraying adversaries as a villain or enemy was common 
within American political discourse between 1990-1991.36 
 In his study of periodicals between 1980 and 1985 scholar Nicholas Howe observed that, 
“originality and vividness are rarely relevant features of political metaphors.”37 Between 1980 
and 1985, when “Guerrilla Warfare” first became a popularly used phrase by American 
politicians,38 Congress often presented U.S. soldiers as “manly” while the opponent as a 
savage.39 One example focused on how then-National Security Advisor Richard Allen claimed 
that a U.S. soldier told him, “I am not a guerrilla fighter; I do my fighting in the trenches in the 
open.”40 The enemy was a guerrilla fighter and thereby associated with cowardice and “of not 
being man enough to fight publicly.”41 “Fighting in the Trenches” became a counter-metaphor 
that evoked a form of warfare that, as Howe observed, “has traditionally seemed more manly.”42 
Much like Ivie’s decivilizing vehicle metaphor, projecting adversaries as inhumane or brutal 
helps inform critics on how politicians define protagonists and antagonists within a conflict. 
Howe’s research suggests that metaphors face frequent recycling: “Original, vivid metaphors 
either disappear quickly because they are too exotic to be absorbed into the political vernacular, 
or else become highly popular and thus lose their initial luster through repetition.”43  
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 Investigating how different crises relate to one another can illuminate further how war 
rhetoric operates. In her analysis of the Ronald Reagan and George H. W. Bush administrations, 
Carol Winkler studied how both presidents handled two different situations in a rhetorically 
similar manner. Specifically, Winkler examined Reagan’s management of U.S. air strikes on 
Libya following clashes with Libyan military forces headed by Muammar Gaddafi; she also 
studied how Bush invaded Iraq after Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait. The notable similarities 
between the two events rested on how both presidents designated Libya and Iraq as long-
standing state sponsors of terror. Winkler argues that both Bush and Reagan delegitimized their 
enemy as despotic and dangerous to increase support for preemptive military action.44 She stated, 
“while reliance on strategic misrepresentation is an expected trait of war rhetoric, its prevalence 
and specific application in the discourse of preemption is noteworthy.”45 The recent 2003 Iraq 
invasion was presented as a preemptive strike against a terrorist threat and echoed Bush and 
Reagan’s calls for military force during their respective administrations. Winkler’s findings shed 
important light on how Ivie’s “delegitimizing the enemy” metaphor permeated legislative 
deliberation during the 1980s and 1990s.46 Consider how Reagan called Gaddafi “the mad dog of 
the Middle East.”47 Congress members sympathetic to the George H. W. Bush administration 
often recycled the president’s arguments in their own speeches by calling Gaddafi “barbarian” 
and even used Reagan’s specific words “mad dog.”48 The representation of the enemy as brutes 
by the Bush and Reagan administrations, as well as among Congress, was not surprising. Rather 
they, “ . . . [arose] at predictable points where preemption strains conformity to the conventional 
expectations of the war genre.”49 
 Much like Winkler, Hal Brands analyzed the rhetoric surrounding public discourse during 
times of crisis. Brands studied how politicians should assess the Japanese Emperor’s culpability 
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for atrocities he oversaw during World War II.50 Brands found that within the Congress, an anti-
Emperor consensus grew quickly. The arguments forwarded by politicians were frequently 
metaphorical; they delegitimized an enemy through decivilizing vehicles. American Foreign 
Service officer and diplomat Joseph Grew, for example, described the Japanese as “sheep” or 
“bees.”51 The Emperor thus served as the shepherd or queen bee. “Without intelligent 
leadership,” as Grew wrote and Brands quoted, the herd, or hive, would “disintegrate.”52 He 
stated that senators, “[used] animal metaphors to make their point.  Federal legislators echoed 
this theme, giving speeches or inserting statements into the Congressional Record asking that the 
Emperor feel the fury of American vengeance after the war.”53 Brands’ research provides useful 
background analysis on how prior political rhetoric has employed arguments driven by 
metaphor.  
 Thomas Goodnight’s analysis of the 2002 Iraqi Congressional debate closely resembles 
this project’s intended artifact of study. Goodnight studied a segment of the debate from both 
chambers of Congress within the context of George W. Bush’s October 7, 2002 Cincinnati 
speech.54 While he included a particular set of arguments by senators and representatives in his 
analysis, the author used the texts to help answer a larger concern: The exploration of 
presidential persuasion as an intertextual “hub” of legislative debate and foreign policy 
articulation.55 Further, Goodnight was interested in examining how presidential rhetoric helped 
established the terms of congressional debate.56 Goodnight’s analysis reinforced a theme present 
in other areas of American political discourse: Following crises, the rhetoric of war favors those 
who support military intervention or combat that would protect those “threatened” ideals, be it 
freedom, democracy, or others. 
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 Goodnight studied the context of the congressional debates in two ways that contrast with 
this thesis project. First, he situates arguments made by Congress around a specific speech Bush 
made. In doing so, he limits the rhetorical context in which he can study the debates. He 
attempted, in part, to reconstruct Bush’s October 7th speech around a specific policy framework 
that he maintained “[blended] the novel event of 9/11 and animosities toward Iraq as a rogue 
state, going back to the first Gulf War.”57 Second, Goodnight spent a small amount of research 
and textual evidence when analyzing the legislative texts from both chambers.58 Whereas he 
provided preliminary analyses of selected congressional statements to support his essay’s 
argument, this project will continue that conversation in a similar, yet distinct direction. Analysis 
here will focus on the modes of argumentation present in the Senate’s texts of the 2002 Iraq 
resolution debate rather than on the framework created by presidential public policy. 
Goodnight’s research is helpful in that it acts as a preface to the thesis, but does not answer a 
critical question. Do important patterns of argumentation exist in the texts of the Senate’s 
deliberation? A study of their speeches and remarks can help answer this question. Exploring 
various statements and responses made during the debate can help illuminate how politicians 
have constructed and forwarded their claims during the Iraq crisis. While the question of how 
researchers have studied prior conflicts is important, the works above only present a general 
view of American political discourse. A more detailed review of George W. Bush’s rhetoric and 
its relationship to Senatorial deliberation is also in order. 
Rhetorical Research on Senatorial Deliberation 
 The rhetorical dimensions of the September 11th, 2001 terrorist attacks as well as the Iraq 
invasion have been well documented. The topic’s popularity among rhetorical scholars is evident 
through searches of journal databases and libraries. President George W. Bush’s speeches 
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represent a majority of rhetorical publications concerning Iraq, while congressional statements 
have received much less attention. Despite such scarcity, several scholars have examined how 
Bush’s rhetoric has influenced public debate in Congress. This subsection considers those 
studies.  
 Bush’s speeches following the 9/11 terrorist attacks sought to influence political leaders 
and the public to support the invasion of Iraq. The White House urged Congress to pass the 
authorization swiftly through its “War on Terror” campaign.59 Media coverage that drowned out 
anti-war sentiments and amplified his rhetoric also aided Bush. Research points toward a 
positive, reciprocal relationship between presidential support and affirmative news coverage.60 
The debate over the Iraq resolution was also short. Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle (D-SD) 
only allotted six days for speeches and statements after he formally introduced the resolution. 
Indeed, Senator Robert Byrd (D-WV) asked from the Senate floor, “Why all the hurry? Why are 
we in such a hurry? I cannot understand why much of the leadership of this Congress has bought 
into the administration’s political pressure.”61 The White House’s urgency to invade Iraq may 
have influenced the debate. For instance, Senator Max Cleland (D-GA) exclaimed that “we need 
to act now”62 in order to neutralize Saddam Hussein’s threat and, like many other senators, cited 
Bush’s push for a speedy authorization. In this particular case, Bush relied on a crisis to 
influence congressional deliberation.    
During times of warfare, rallying around a common cause can provide temporary relief to 
a grieving nation. As polls have shown, Americans generally support war efforts during the 
beginning stages of a conflict.63 However, this approval wanes over time. For example, after the 
Pearl Harbor attacks, Americans adamantly wanted war. A few years into World War II, such 
approval drastically weakened.64 Similarly, the American public approved Lyndon B. Johnson’s 
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Vietnam War efforts by 57% in January of 1967.65 By February of 1968, though, the ratings fell 
to 32%.66 After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Americans again felt the need to respond with hard 
military power. During the Iraq/Afghanistan invasions, George Bush’s approval ratings reached 
76% in April of 2003.67 Then he hit an all-time low of 41% in May of 2004 and continued to stay 
low throughout his second term.68 By 2008, Democratic presidential candidate Barack Obama 
based his successful campaign on his efforts against the war. Thus, Bush’s campaign for Iraq’s 
invasion seized a kairotic moment—a classical term that describes how speakers have the ability 
to adapt to unfolding and changing circumstances.69 Robert Ivie describes how Bush used God-
terms like freedom and democracy soon after the terrorist attacks so as to ensure that Americans 
would “respond with patriotic fervor and rage. . . . [T]he battle line was plainly drawn and the 
choice reduced to siding with the United States or its enemy. . . .”70  
What does this mean for Senate deliberation? Voices of dissent from Congress have not 
been met with kindness. Presidential demagoguery has galvanized pro-war politicians and has 
historically painted congressional dissidence as anti-American. The Red Scare against 
communism during the 1950s, for example, forced moderate and liberal Congress members to 
navigate matters of foreign affairs carefully.71 Arguing against the blatant persecution of 
Communist sympathizers may have stifled political debate. Robert Ivie and Oscar Giner claim 
that prior to communism’s fall, “scholars had warned that a rising rhetorical presidency 
constituted a serious and growing threat to republican governance—that a worsening condition 
of presidential demagoguery, or direct appeal to the masses, bypassed responsible deliberation in 
Congress.”72 The Red Scare’s influence on congressional debate may have discouraged or 
tempered an anti-war politician’s arguments out of fear of undermining the president and a 
popularized cause.73 This information is useful when studying the 2002 Iraq resolution’s debate 
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because a critic, when examining senatorial texts, may discern patterns of reasoning that echo the 
types of arguments made against politicians who did not have a hard-line stance against 
communism in the 1950s.   
Examining how George W. Bush’s rhetoric influenced both public and legislative debates 
has helped elucidate how Congress reacts and responds to presidential rhetoric. The way that 
politicians argue for or against American intervention during crises is also noteworthy. The 
pressure to resolve threats militaristically can shape the types of arguments forwarded by 
members of Congress. 
 Yet, the existing rhetorical research concerning Iraq does not directly answer or 
completely document the particular modes of argumentation made by senators on the issue. This 
review of literature, however, indicates that the Senate’s deliberation on the 2002 authorization 
resolution is unique and deserves study. The legislative body’s function and responsibility to 
construct, analyze, and debate the laws it passes is indisputably important. As former Senate 
Majority Leader Tom Daschle notes, “In a healthy democracy such as ours, it is not only the 
right, but it is the duty of the ‘opposition party’ to fight for what it believes in. It is out of the 
process and discipline of reasoned and rigorous debate that strong and sound legislation and 
policy are shaped. Such debate is at the heart of the system of government created by our 
Founding Fathers.”74 
The Senate’s Uniqueness  
 It is important to note the unique traits that differentiates the Senate chamber from the 
House chamber. These traits often shape the way debate is held and structured, either formally 
through Senate-specific rules or by chamber tradition. The Senate has policy goals and 
policymaking tools distinct from the House of Representatives. The Senate is often characterized 
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as individualistic because the chamber is “known for its oversized personalities and 
iconoclasts.”75 Also, senators’ six-year terms provide more time to grow their policy agendas. 
Although there are significantly fewer senators than representatives, senators must cover the 
same policy ground and are more likely to be policy generalists rather than specialists.76 The 
chamber also greatly values its debates.77 For instance, unlike the House, the Senate has 
unlimited floor debate and is characterized as more collegial.78 The chamber’s functions are 
“determined by the behavior of the individuals within it” and guided by the institution’s norms 
and rules.79 
 Throughout its long history, the Senate has established primacy in foreign affairs.80 
Senate influence in shaping international policy evolved from an “occasional and tangential 
function” in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to one that has “increased the Senate’s role 
in the formation of foreign policy far beyond what had been envisioned by the framers of the 
Constitution.”81 While such expansion may have never been intended, the new global position of 
the United States following World War II equipped the Senate with an expanded function in 
foreign policy creation and consultation. Today, senators must make efficient use of their time 
when they speak on the floor because the chamber’s rules prohibit members from speaking more 
than twice on the same issue in a single day.82 The body’s distinguishing features can help 
explain why senators may feel compelled to engage in certain rhetorical strategies, such as 
inflammatory comments or grandstanding. These features produce opportunities and constraints 
that can influence deliberations. As political scholars Sarah Binder and Steven Smith add, “in 
designing the Senate, the framers chose institutional features with an eye restraining any ill-
considered or rash legislation passed by the popularly elected House. . . . That the Senate was 
intended to be the more deliberative and reasoning of the two chambers is well known.”83 
 
15 
 
Analytical Framework 
 This project first employs a close textual analysis of the Senate’s debate on the 2002 Iraq 
resolution. However, it is worthwhile to note that this project, in its initial stages, adhered to 
rhetorical scholar Wayne Brockreide’s advice that critics be guided inductively by the discourse 
they are studying.84 Rhetorical criticism unfolds most productively as an inductive practice that 
discovers the “relationship of persons and ideas within a situation texts.”85 Halloran’s essay helps 
inform us on this process. He studied the televised debate of the House Judiciary Committee on 
the impeachment of Richard Nixon as an example.86 The committee’s debate represented a 
rhetorical experience that detailed how public proceedings, as a genre, should be studied in terms 
of both the situation and form.87 Public proceedings refer to events where “an official business 
session of a representative body, including debate and decision specific issues, conducted before 
an audience made up of members of the body’s constituency.”88 The Senate’s debate on the 2002 
Iraq resolution exemplifies this definition since the chamber is a representative body and its 
deliberation took place among those representatives. The texts of this debate thereby constitute a 
“series of persuasive messages addressed by participants to other participants whose agreement 
they hope to win.”89 The takeaway message from Halloran’s teachings is that a greater 
understanding of the Senate’s deliberation on Iraq is obtained when we allow the discourse to 
guide the criticism. A critical, and early, part of this process involves a deep textual study that 
can illuminate the unique attributes and modes of argumentation that emerge from a reading of 
those texts.  
 A close textual analysis requires two necessary components. First, the selected set of 
senatorial statements are examined intrinsically so that their unique characteristics are traced. 
These characteristics involve identifying and documenting their argument structure, supporting 
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material, tone, denotative and connotative meanings.90 Second, the texts are oriented in terms of 
their external settings.91 This step considers the text in relation to the audience and situation that 
is called forward by the rhetors. That is, the critic must understand how speeches form rhetorical 
acts and, as theorist Michael Leff explains, respond to political and economic circumstances that 
develop over time.92 A close textual analysis must account for the interplay between the intrinsic 
and extrinsic dimensions of particular acts. Exploring this relationship will aid in revealing the 
significance between the rhetorical situation, which broadly centered on President Bush seeking 
Congressional authorization to invade Iraq, and the negotiated response, how the Senate debated 
whether or not to give Bush that authorization. “The central task of textual criticism,” as Leff 
describes, “is to understand how rhetorical action effects this negotiation, how the construction 
of a symbolic event invites a reconstruction of the events to which it refers.”93 A close textual 
analysis, then, can yield cues of the Senate’s public discourse by evaluating the Senate’s texts on 
its own terms.  
The close textual analysis is presented as a descriptive inventory on the Senate’s debate 
on S.J.Res. 46. In order to explain these cues, I then turn to Robert Ivie’s work on metaphoric 
criticism. For purposes of this project, metaphor is taken as a linguistic device for interpreting or 
experiencing a phenomenon in terms of something else. Kenneth Burke expands on this idea by 
explaining that metaphor aids in bringing out “the thisness of a that or the thatness of a this.”94 A 
metaphor involves a pattern, event, object, person, or structure that is reinvented and 
reinterpreted through language. Burke labels metaphor as a perspective.95 The Senate’s debate is 
thereby viewed through the perspectives of each speaker and the ways that they characterize 
those perspectives. For instance, while no two speakers refer to Saddam Hussein in exactly the 
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same way, they do employ metaphors that dehumanize the Iraqi leader. These patterns help form 
the metaphoric clusters discussed in chapter three. 
Rationale 
 Congressional discourse, like many public policy debates, is constrained by its 
polysemous and temporal nature. As texts, policy debates complicate a rhetorical study because 
they are neither isolated in authorship nor singular in time.96 In comparison to a single speech, 
for instance, a public hearing may include tens or hundreds or even thousands of authors.97 
Policy debates also occur over a period of time. It is necessary to consider how debates unfold as 
a series rather than an isolated communicative act. Depending on how critics frame their studies, 
a debate may begin long before a formalized hearing and include artifacts of interest other than 
the conventional scripts of a debate. A critic must, as Robert Asen observed, analyze policy texts 
as a process rather than a fragmented set of case studies.98 This leads to a critical question 
concerning the framework of this thesis project: What would a rhetorical study of the Senate’s 
debate on S.J.Res. 46 look like? 
 To answer this question, the guides are Robert Asen’s research in public policy rhetoric 
and Matthew Glass’ 1993 work on the MX weapons system controversy. In his insightful study 
of the national debate on U.S. welfare policy in the 1990s, Asen described how he had to sift 
through the testimony of over a thousand witnesses and numerous hearings to determine his 
ultimate focus.99 He explained, “My analysis does not attempt to reproduce these debates 
chronologically or entirely, but draws excerpts from disparate hearings to sketch the 
development of the debates thematically through key concepts and images. I consider individual 
statements in greater detail to explicate the functioning of the reform consensus.”100 This thesis 
follows a similar direction, although with a narrower scope. A macro and micro analysis of the 
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debate, as Asen did, allows the critic to synthesize individual speeches in order to reconstruct 
recurring themes and patterns. It is also important to pause and consider transformative moments 
in the debate, and to analyze exceptional or representative texts. This approach reflects Asen’s 
argument that “participants in policy debates make meaning” and “circulate their preferred 
meanings more widely.”101 Rather than study every single speech from every participating 
senator, selecting individual texts based on the criteria explicated below can yield a richer 
analysis of the debates. Asen contends, “as rhetorical scholars interested in public policy, we 
have to delimit our studies somehow, and I do not mean to suggest that macro-analyses must 
examine every potentially relevant utterance. Instead, a macrolevel analysis must cast a 
sufficiently wide net to elucidate the diverse perspectives forwarded by the multiple authors of 
policy debate and the developments in policy debates over time.”102 Craig Rood adds that 
rhetorical studies like Asen’s work on Social Security, Celeste Condit’s study of how powerful 
visuals transformed the antiabortion movement during the 1960s and 1970s, and J. Michael 
Hogan’s analysis of the Panama Canal Treaty debates, are not historically comprehensive even 
though their objects of study had a wide-ranging timeline.103 “None examines each and every 
rhetorical artifact relating to its subject,” Rood explains, “instead, they incorporated discourses 
circulating at different times.”104  
 Moreover, while Asen helps explain how texts are selected for this project, Glass’ work 
best informs the organization of the chapters that follow. In his study of the public debates 
surrounding the MX weapons system controversy during President Jimmy Carter’s 
administration, Glass arranged his book so that he directly addressed the debate in his second 
chapter after providing necessary background information in the first chapter.105 In doing so, he 
first explored the texts and allowed applications of relevant rhetorical, political, and social theory 
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to follow inductively in subsequent chapters. In addition to examining congressional and state 
hearings, Glass included “interviews between the summer of 1987 and the spring of 1988 with 
thirty-five individuals involved in the Great Basin opposition. I did not attempt to compile any 
sort of random sampling.”106 Similarly, this project continues the context established in the first 
chapter into the second. A descriptive inventory of the senate’s texts is then presented. To avoid 
treating the debate as a succession of speeches, textual emphasis is placed on the arguments 
made so as to sketch the debate thematically.  
 While Asen’s teachings explain why scrutinizing every single senatorial remark made on 
S.J.Res. 46 would be inefficacious, his work does not detail how the thirty texts were chosen 
within the framework of this project. Since debates were held on October 4th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 
10th, 2002, six speeches from each date were chosen. The only exception is October 8th, where 
four speeches were selected because the debate was significantly reduced due to a shortened day. 
Further, the number of Republican and Democratic Senators who participated were uneven each 
day. For instance, on day one, twelve Republican Senators and seven Democratic Senators 
spoke. On day two, nine Republican Senators and fourteen Democratic Senators spoke. To adjust 
for this irregular composition, equal numbers of Democratic Senators and Republican Senators 
were selected. This decision also addressed the concern of possibly displaying bias based on 
political affiliation. Two factors further narrowed the selection of these speeches: Senators’ 
leadership roles and seniority. Why? Rather than choosing random speeches from each day, texts 
were chosen so as to highlight the possibly more influential speeches of higher-ranking Senators 
while still maintaining an equal count of Democrats and Republicans per day. Leadership role 
was prioritized because Senators with designated titles such as Senate Majority Leader, Senate 
Minority Whip, etc. receive greater news coverage than Senators who do not.107 Congress 
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members in leadership roles are not only interviewed more often, but are often viewed as more 
credible sources of information.108 Leadership may, therefore, bring greater attention to certain 
Senators’ statements and the public may also lend greater credence to their arguments.  
After considering leadership, Senators with higher seniority are given preference in 
selecting texts for analysis. This factor fits with the norms of the legislative branch. The seniority 
system describes the practice of granting privileges to Congress members who have served the 
longest.109 Compared to junior senators, senior members are likely to be more influential in 
shaping legislation because their chances of being assigned with ranking membership or as chair 
of a committee typically increase with their seniority. Authors Gerald Gamm and Steven Smith 
found in their study of U.S. news coverage on Senatorial debates that, “Overall, it appears that 
the media in general focus on those senators whose ranking positions warrant such attention.”110 
Consequently, a Senator’s position  may depict him or her as having greater authority during a 
debate.111 The Senate Pro Tempore, for instance, is third in line to succeed the President and is 
the second highest official ranking in the Senate. Since 1890, this position has frequently been 
given to the longest serving senator in the majority party in power.112 The nature of this ranking 
system not only helps narrow the selection of the texts based on different criteria, but also 
considers the norms of the Senate. 
 Table one (please see Appendix A) lists the Senators chosen in accordance with the 
rationale discussed above. Thirty speeches are gathered from twenty-four Senators. The 
additional two texts not listed in table one come from Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle on 
March 18th, 2002, and September 25, 2002. These two speeches, while not presented on the 
Senate floor during the formal debate on S.J.Res. 46, represent two key points before the debates 
that merit attention. The March 18th speech is the first formal recognition by the Majority Leader 
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of the 107th Senate on the issue of granting President George W. Bush congressional approval to 
invade Iraq. This address helps outline the beginning of the debate. The September 25th speech 
represents the final remarks a sitting Senator gave right before the debates began, which was also 
by Senate Majority Leader Daschle. It is important to note that leadership tradition in Congress 
has typically guided the Senate Majority Leader and the Speaker of the House of Representatives 
to opt out of the debates.113 Instead, they deliver remarks about the progress of certain legislation 
more frequently than they participate in its deliberation. Including these two speeches reflects the 
project’s efforts to represent the debates as a diachronic process rather than an isolated event or 
moment. 
The discourse surrounding the 2003 Iraq invasion has received significant attention by 
rhetorical scholars. The sparse scholarly attention placed on the discursive dimensions of 
Congress’ role in the invasion does not, by itself, justify why the project merits criticism. 
Studying the deliberation on the 2002 Senate Joint Resolution 46 can enhance our understanding 
of congressional debate broadly and political argumentation among senators between 2002 and 
2004 specifically. While the Constitution grants Congress with the task to construct, debate, 
review, and pass legislation, the Senate has often been labeled as the “World’s Greatest 
Deliberative Body”114 and its expectation to debate is arguably higher. Studying the public 
arguments senators presented in support for or against the invasion of Iraq can lead to a greater 
appreciation of the invasion’s rhetorical dimensions.  
Organization of Chapters 
This thesis is separated into four chapters. Chapter two consists of an introduction 
focusing on the months before the Senate’s debate on S.J.Res. 46. It is important to establish 
context information on the current events leading up to the debate. This section then transitions 
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into a descriptive inventory of the thirty selected speeches. The inventory provides a textual 
analysis of Senators’ speeches and documents the recurring themes that emerged throughout the 
debate. Accomplishing this task required of the arguments the Senators made, the structure of the 
arguments themselves, and the advocates’ supporting material. A metaphoric analysis of that 
inventory takes place in chapter three. This chapter accomplishes two tasks. First, it develops the 
framework that guides the analysis of the texts in greater depth, fully exploring the functions of 
metaphor criticism. Second, the descriptive inventory is then examined within that framework. 
This section dissects the metaphorical concepts, or clusters, observed in the debate, which 
included FORCE, TIME, and STATUS. These clusters are defined and the process that led to 
their discovery is explicated. The final section presents the results of the analysis and the 
relationship between the clusters are discussed. Finally, chapter four summarizes the analysis, 
discusses the potential implications stemming from the research, and delineates the studies’ 
strengths and shortcomings.  
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Chapter Two: Descriptive Inventory 
On October 2nd, 2002, House of Representatives Speaker John Hastert (R-IL) and House 
Minority Leader Richard Gephardt (D-MI) presented the joint resolution titled “Authorization 
for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002” to the United States Senate chamber 
for consideration. The resolution, shortened S.J.Res. 46, spanned 14 days from its introduction 
on October 2nd to its signing by President George W. Bush on October 16th.1 The Senate 
dedicated five days—October 4th, October 7th, October 8th, October 9th, and October 10th—to 
debate. While these dates provide most of the texts analyzed here, two speeches by Senate 
Majority Leader Tom Daschle preceding October 4th are also included. Together, a total of thirty 
speeches are studied. This descriptive inventory of S.J.Res. 46 details what the Senators stated, 
how they argued for or against the resolution, and support for said arguments. This inventory 
allows for the inductive analysis in the succeeding chapter, taking the texts “on their own terms.” 
This chapter is separated into two sections: (1) a brief context surrounding the debates follows 
the inventory, and (2) the inventory itself. 
Context  
 Public policy deliberation operates in the present and aims to shape the future, but it is 
also mediated and guided by the past. Separating context from the debate would only impede 
understanding. This section builds upon the background information laid out in the first chapter 
and traces the context leading up to the Senate’s debate on S.J.Res. 46 on October 4th, 2002. 
 While Tom Daschle spoke of Bush’s handling of the Iraq crisis in March of 2002, 
Congressional inquiry into authorizing military force accelerated quickly after the President’s 
address before the United Nations General Assembly on September 12, 2002.2 Bush asked the 
General Assembly that disarming Iraqi President Saddam Hussein required not only U.S. 
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initiative but also the backing of the international community.3 Seven days later, on September 
19th, the White House sent a draft of the “Resolution Authorizing Military Force Against Iraq” to 
Congress. Bush then held a press conference on September 24th, where he cited his U.N. speech 
and explained that he sought both international and legislative authorization to invade Iraq. In 
this speech, Bush urged Congress to debate and pass the resolution before the November 5th 
midterm elections. He contended, “Congress must act now to pass a resolution which will hold 
Saddam Hussein to account for a decade of defiance.”4  
 In the eleven months preceding the debate, the Bush administration argued that Hussein 
had maintained a stockpile of chemical and biological weapons or Weapons of Mass Destruction 
(WMD). This stockpile violated U.N. resolutions and, despite the Bush’s administration’s 
diplomatic efforts, Hussein had continued to develop these weapons.5 Bush also claimed that 
Hussein’s threat extended beyond Iraq and that he could give these WMD to terrorists. Deputy 
Prime Minister Abdul Tawab Al-Mulah Huwaish publicly denied that his government possessed 
WMD and, amidst the possibility of an invasion, on October 10th, 2002 offered U.N. weapons 
inspectors access to Iraq for the first time since 1998.6 Huwaish stated, "If the American 
administration is interested in inspecting these sites, then they're welcome to come over and have 
a look for themselves.”7 The White House announced the following day that they rejected the 
offer and stated it would oppose the return of U.N. weapon inspectors to Iraq without a new 
resolution from the U.N. Security Council.8 
 Upon its presentation to the chamber by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and 
the House Minority Leader, Senator Joe Lieberman (D-CT) officially introduced the resolution 
along with Senators John McCain (R-AZ), Evan Bayh (D-IN), and John Warner (R-VA). These 
Senators joined President Bush for a short announcement at the White House later that same day. 
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This event came on the heels of S.J.Res. 46’s introduction into the Senate where Bush 
contended, “The text of our bipartisan resolution is clear and it is strong. The statement of 
support from the Congress will show to friend and enemy alike the resolve of the United States. 
In Baghdad, the regime will know that full compliance with all U.N. security demands is the 
only choice and the time remaining for that choice is limited.”9 
 Ahead of the October 10th vote, Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle (D-SD) explained 
that it was important for the country “to speak with one voice at this critical moment.”10 He 
qualified this statement by warning Bush to move “in a way that avoids making a dangerous 
situation even worse.”11 S.J.Res. 46 passed the Senate and was approved by the House with 
wider margins than the similar 1991 resolution that gave former President George H. W. Bush 
legislative authority to force out Hussein’s army from neighboring Kuwait.12 S.J.Res. 46 limited 
the use of the U.S. military force in Iraq as well as any “current ongoing threats” present during 
the invasion.13  Bush had to inform Congress within 48 hours before or after initiating military 
action against Iraq. The resolution also required his administration to submit a progress report to 
Congress every sixty days.14   
Descriptive Inventory 
 United States Senate Majority Leaders wield significant power as the chief spokesperson 
of the chamber and their political party.15 During the 107th Congress, Senator Tom Daschle 
served as both the Minority and Majority Leader on different occasions.16 On March 18th, 2002, 
then minority leader Daschle initiated the first of many skeptical remarks concerning Bush’s 
strategy in the Iraq crisis. These statements were presented seven months before the formal 
Senate debate on the invasion and during the early diplomatic stages concerning how to disarm 
Saddam Hussein. In one of the most highly televised segments of his speech, he stated, “I am 
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saddened, saddened that this president failed so miserably at diplomacy that we’re now forced to 
war. Saddened that we have to give up one life because this president couldn’t create the kind of 
diplomatic effort that was so critical for our country.”17  
 The speech exemplifies what political scholar Doris Graber described as strategic 
interpretation.18 Politicians employ this pragmatic function of political language in order to 
“interpret events’ meanings, put them into context, and speculate about their consequences.”19 
Graber’s work sheds insight into how senators used certain words or phrases to connect acts 
and/or actors to a particular conclusion.20 The way a politician interprets an event can, as Graber 
writes, affect “the political consequences of media reports.”21 By linking or suggesting the 
relationships between events, political leaders may “shape opinions without explicitly telling 
audiences which views seem right or wrong.”22 Given Congress had already authorized Bush to 
invade Afghanistan, Daschle portrayed the President’s diplomatic efforts as having “failed so 
miserably” concerning the Iraq crisis that the United States was pushed to the brink of a second 
war.23 Controlling how the public interprets emerging events can explain why Daschle 
constructed his early comments on Bush’s diplomatic efforts. As the representative of the 
opposition party, Daschle’s speech presented his apprehensive position in authorizing the 
president to invade Iraq. For instance, he stated that if “the United States does act militarily 
against Iraq, it is important that we continue diplomacy to pull together the broadest coalition. . . 
. At the same time it is also important that we remain committed to addressing our other pressing 
national security threats.”24 Here, Daschle advocated for a broader strategic approach to 
resolving the Iraqi crisis in addition to military force. As the initial diplomatic foray into Iraq 
was underway, Daschle’s speech presented the first of many critiques that questioned the 
administration. 
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 On September 25, 2002, Daschle delivered another speech that denounced Bush’s 
politicization of the Iraq crisis. His remarks, delivered on the Senate floor, came shortly after 
Bush’s latest statement where Bush claimed, "the Senate is more interested in special interests in 
Washington and not interested in the security of the American people.”25 Daschle retorted, “We 
ought not politicize this war. We ought not to politicize the rhetoric about war in life and death. 
So, Mr. President, it’s not too late to end this politicization.”26 This exchange reveals tensions 
that had been building between Daschle and the White House concerning Iraq.27 Many 
Democrats suspected that Bush deliberately timed the resolution’s debate to coincide with the 
November 5th, 2002 midterm elections, which many predicted would likely see a shift in the 
majority party that would determine control of Congress.28 Daschle offered an explanation of 
politicization by stating, “It’s not too late to forget the pollsters, forget the campaign fund-
raisers, forget making accusations about how interested in national security Democrats are, and 
let’s get this job done right. . . .”29 One solution he provided to avoid this politicization was to 
slow down and avoid rushing a resolution through the chamber. This argument became a 
recurring proposal during the debates. A few vocal Senators asserted that not enough debate time 
was delegated to discuss such a momentous resolution. In a similar claim, Senators also urged 
the chamber to hold a vote after the midterm elections. Despite these calls, the vote was still held 
before the elections.  
 On October 4th, 2002, Senator Jim Bunning (R-KY) began the official Senatorial debate 
on S.J.Res. 46 with his immediate declaration supporting Bush’s efforts to invade Iraq. His 
speech laid out a claim that frequently emerged in the arguments of other pro-resolution 
Senators: Saddam Hussein failed to fulfill past promises. Specifically, Bunning emphasized that 
Hussein had violated sixteen United Nations Security Council resolutions in the past six years, 
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having “broken his word at every opportunity.”30 Bunning used the word “broke/broken” seven 
times throughout his speech and framed Hussein as the primary actor in Iraq’s state-sponsored 
terrorism. Believing Hussein had been given ample opportunity to comply with international 
sanctions, the Kentucky Senator began his speech by presenting Hussein as a growing threat—a 
threat that he stated the Bush administration had long been building before the debate.31 Senator 
George Voinovich (R-OH) voiced support for the resolution based on similar claims of betrayal. 
Voinovich argued that, “I don't see how we can let Saddam fool us again. There is absolutely no 
doubt in my mind that Saddam Hussein cannot be trusted.”32 Whereas Bunning made broader 
claims with little specific reference to material evidence, other than referencing U.N. Security 
Council resolutions, Voinovich provided a line-by-line documentation of wrongs by Hussein. 
Going back to the 1980-1988 Iraq-Iran War, he listed the number of casualties by Hussein’s 
deployment of chemical weapons “against his own people and his neighbors.”33 He continued in 
a fashion similar to Bunning in that he dedicated a majority of the speech to discussing the 
wrongs made by Hussein rather than the specific content of S.J.Res. 46.  
 While Bunning and Voinovich represent only two speeches from this debate, the way 
they stylize their arguments to focus more on a perceived threat (Hussein) and less on the 
specifics of the resolution they are voting on becomes apparent in other pro-resolution Senators 
as well. Republican Senator John Warner (R-VA) spent much of his speech outlining the 
growing threat of Hussein’s despotism.34 Warner publicly agreed with Bunning and Voinovich in 
that leaving Hussein alone would only put vital U.S. national security interests in harm’s way. 
“Time,” Warner warned, “is Saddam Hussein’s ally. Time is not ours.”35 Bunning, Voinovich, 
and Warner employed the word “threat” with specific reference to Hussein a total of 32 times. 
Together, the top-ranking participating Republican Senators on the first day of the debate began 
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articulating an urgency to pass quickly a resolution. Bunning’s, Voinovich’s, and Warner’s 
claims, which presented Hussein as a growing threat that demanded swift action, represent an 
emerging narrative in the debate. Their speeches echoed Bush’s push for a quick resolution by 
framing Hussein as the target. They depicted his state-sponsored terrorism as an evolving threat 
and diagnosed said threat as requiring immediate action.  
 Senator Carl Levin (D-MI) was the first Democratic Senator to speak on the floor on 
S.J.Res. 46. In his statements, Levin presented two arguments for voting against the bill. First, 
despite claims made by the Bush administration that all diplomatic options in resolving 
Hussein’s state-sponsored terrorism had been exhausted, the United States should continue to 
exercise multilateral diplomatic negotiations with Iraq rather than invading it. The latter half of 
Levin’s speech turned to his second major claim: more time is needed before a decision can be 
made on whether military force should be authorized.36 Moreover, much like Bunning’s, 
Voinovich’s, and Warner’s arguments, Levin employed statistics and statements from the United 
Nations to support his argument. The primary difference was in how he used those references to 
warn the Senate against a rushed debate. Levin was cautious in word choice as he described that, 
“It is very important that we carefully consider the short-term and the long-term effects of 
unilateral action by the United States.”37 In fact, Levin used the word “careful” six times 
throughout his speech. Senator Ron Wyden (D-OR) took note that Levin in particular was 
“expressing caution, and with good reason.”38 In many ways, Wyden’s speech continued many 
arguments that Levin forwarded; the cautious approach to invading Iraq was apparent. For 
example, Wyden observed that Senators sympathetic to the administration’s cause were “very 
anxious” in equipping Bush with the legislative authority he requested.39 Cutting his speech short 
to discuss matters of energy and foreign oil, Wyden yielded the floor by concluding, “I do not 
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think this is a matter [S.J.Res. 46] that Congress can afford to ignore. Let us dedicate more time 
to deliberate.”40 
 Senator Robert Byrd (D-WV), a verbose speaker on the Iraq invasion throughout the 
debate, commanded the floor during his speech on October 4th, 2002 as he delivered the longest 
speech on S.J.Res. 46 that day.41 In these remarks, Byrd levied a number of claims. He 
emphasized what Democratic Senators before him had already mentioned: Slow down. Byrd 
argued that Hussein had long since been a foe to United States interests. “This is not new. This is 
not a new pretext. These things are not new, but they are new just before this election.”42 Byrd 
rejected arguments that Hussein was, following the September 11th terrorist attacks, a fresh and 
emerging threat.43 He described the rise of Hussein and the various actions taken by the United 
States government in the 1990s to evince his argument that Hussein, as a threat, should not come 
surprisingly. With this support in place, Byrd implied that the U.S. midterm elections may have 
politicized this issue so as to hasten deliberation. He stated, “Let us come back after the election 
and then debate, and then, who knows? I might join with the distinguished Senator in promoting 
a resolution to declare war, Congress declare war.”44 The rest of this speech employed two 
pieces of evidence in support of prolonging debate beyond the six days that were scheduled. The 
1,400 telephone calls from his constituents was the first piece, in which Byrd claimed that 
“almost every single caller has said: Wait. Slow down. Don't rush this through.”45 The second 
supporting material recalled various points in American history that demonstrated how the U.S. 
has often rushed into warfare. Byrd cited the invasion of Grenada in 1983 and the “hasty”46 Gulf 
of Tonkin resolution as examples. His pleas to extend debate and consideration became a 
common theme throughout his arguments in the days to come. Before yielding the floor, Byrd 
exclaimed, “You don't want this resolution rammed through this Congress. . . .”47 
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 On October 7th, when Senate debate on the resolution resumed after a three-day hiatus, 
Senators Max Cleland (D-GA) and Bill Nelson (D-FL) presented two speeches in support of 
S.J.Res. 46. Their remarks were similar in that they referenced violations of United Nations 
Security Council resolutions by Hussein in supporting Iraq’s invasion. Rather than echo the 
urgency of Hussein as an immediate threat, as Republican Senators before them had, Cleland and 
Nelson presented the resolution as an instrument of diplomacy rather than an assurance of war.  
Nelson stated, “This resolution will serve as Saddam's last chance at a peaceful conclusion to his 
years of defiance of international law,”48 while Cleland proclaimed that the resolution is “one 
last chance to secure Saddam Hussein's final, unconditional surrender of those weapons, as he 
has pledged since 1991.”49 
 A difference in the view of the debate time is worth discussing, because as the debates 
progressed pro-resolution Senators expressed the debate positively while opposing Senators, like 
Byrd, argued that although the debate was “robust,”50 more time was needed. Whereas Byrd 
thought not enough debate time was allotted, Cleland disagreed. Cleland contended, “We are 
engaged in a deliberate and civil and thorough discussion. We are moving toward a strong 
resolution.”51 On October 7th, Byrd continued questioning the chamber at large why a resolution 
had to be passed by the end of the week. He asked, “Why now? Those two little words: Why 
now? Why are we in such a hurry?”52 This speech was, in part, a response to Senator Warner 
who responded to Byrd’s speech on October 4th by explaining that “the most significant 
concerns” regarding the invasion had either already been addressed by another Senator or the 
Bush administration.53 Unsatisfied, Byrd asked a total of 63 questions in this speech to convey 
the point that not all answers relating to the resolution were provided. These questions included 
asking how long the invasion would take, if adequate care for deployed soldiers had been 
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accounted for, how an invasion would affect the growing instability of the Middle East, and 
dedicating fifteen questions to asking how much this invasion would cost.54 In fact, he spent 
much of this speech asking questions to demonstrate his perceived observation that the Senate 
had not yet been thorough in its debate. This concern was expressed days prior by Democratic 
Senators, specifically Levin and Wyden, and continued to emerge as the debate progressed. Yet 
when considering this concern, an important question came to mind: How long of a debate is, or 
should be considered, enough? Byrd suggested that the Senators wait until after the midterm 
elections on November 5th, 2002 to vote. In one of his many calls to extend debate time, he 
stated, “We should not have this vote on the issue for war or for peace before the Congress has 
answers to these questions.”55 
 As was observed in the literature review, U.S. foreign policy rhetoric is no stranger to 
justifying military operations abroad, in part, by portraying the enemy in savage terms.56 On 
October 7th, 2002, Senators Jon Kyl (R-AZ), Pete Domenici (R-NM), and Orrin Hatch (R-UT) 
depicted Hussein’s despotic regime as inhumane. Hatch argued, “If you have evidence of your 
enemy's cold capabilities and with Saddam Hussein we do and if you have evidence of his 
enmity and with Saddam Hussein we do--then do not err on the side of wishful thinking. With 
enemies with the destructive capabilities of Saddam Hussein, we must be hard-headed.”57 Kyl 
vociferously went after Hussein in his speech, depicting him as a murderer, his government “so 
savage as to flaunt its crimes,” and the “shocking brutality” of a “vicious dictator.”58 Domenici, 
the final speaker on the resolution for that day, offered a vivid decivilizing characterization of 
Hussein.59 He presented the invasion of Iraq as a national commitment to address “a hostile and 
aggressive enemy.”60 Comparing Hussein to a “beast” with multiple heads, Domenici argued that 
forceful disarmament is necessary. He stated, “How is he most apt to disarm? What is most apt 
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to make him disarm? Talk? Resolutions? I think not. Complete military force needs to be granted 
to the President and I will give the President authority to use our military forces along with other 
countries so as to avoid the use of weapons of mass destruction by Saddam Hussein.”61 The way 
the Senators spoke when discussing the Iraqi leader was in a way that dehumanized him. How 
could one not want to topple his government?  How could one not want to decapitate the “heads” 
of a beast? On October 7th, Senator Kyl (R-AZ) argued that Hussein was “not just another Arab 
despot. Saddam Hussein is a figure of singular repugnance, and singular danger. No one else 
comes close to matching his extraordinary and variegated record of malevolence.”62 The 
following day, on October 8th, 2002, Senator McCain continued this portrayal of Hussein by 
labeling the dictator as a “predator.”63 McCain spent much of his speech rebuking other Senators 
who stressed greater diplomacy by explaining that one cannot “negotiate with terror.”64 Before 
ending his speech, he stated it was in America’ best interest to “[Get] rid of the menace posed by 
Saddam Hussein's weapons of terror.”65 
 Robert Ivie explains how political metaphors become “habits of discourse that condition 
us to accept these images as literal statements.”66 While Ivie focused on Cold War rhetoric, his 
broader historical discussion on how American foreign policy rhetoric tends to operate, in part, 
by the use of imagery adds insight in examining the Senate’s debate. The use of decivilizing 
comparisons helped portray adversaries as a brutal and violent entity in an effort to dehumanize 
them and, consequently, to impugn their actions.67 The various terms used to describe Hussein 
helped support the frequent argument that Hussein was not only a threat, but a barbaric threat. 
The possibility of diplomatic negotiations was then argued as futile because the U.S. is no longer 
dealing with a person—rather they are dealing with a menace, a predator, a beast, and a 
murderer. Senator Joseph Lieberman (D-CT) double-downed on McCain’s portrayal of the Iraqi 
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leader by agreeing that “the extraordinary acts of brutality he has committed himself demands an 
extraordinary response.”68 Lieberman’s description of Hussein lead him to conclude that such 
barbarianism was too large to ignore.69  
 Similarly, other Senators made the same claim of Hussein as an emerging threat using 
similar supporting material. After building the case that America was not dealing with a foreign 
leader but some inhumane entity, several Senators insisted that America’s response should be 
proportionate to the threat being faced. Lieberman addressed Hussein directly, stating, “The 
danger you represent is so great.”70 Nearly every speaker, Democrat or Republican, employed 
decivilizing vehicle metaphors when referring to Hussein. This habit formed a pattern of imagery 
that not only qualified Hussein's character negatively, but also indirectly made opponents appear 
weak or sympathetic for opposing a resolution that would use military force against such an 
inhumane leader. McCain verbalized this idea on October 8th when he asked the chamber, “How 
can you ignore so much evil?”71  
 The use of decivilizing metaphors was complemented by another frequently used trope, 
that of affirming threatening expectations. Ivie describes this metaphor as an attempt to solidify a 
threat by pointing to a law or rule that was violated by said threat.72 Senators referred to 
violations of past United Nations Security Council resolutions as an affirmation of Hussein’s 
threatening nature. Hussein was not only evil, but an international regulating body had served to 
confirm that evil. On the first day of the debate, October 4th, Senator Wyden (D-OR) proclaimed 
that the debate should treat Hussein “as a proven criminal.”73 Senator Evan Bayh (D-IN) 
referenced Wyden and expressed his agreement with the Oregon Senator, stating, “Congress 
should give the President the authority he believes he needs to protect American national security 
against an often irrational dictator who has demonstrated a history of aggression outside his 
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borders. . . .”74 Similarly, Senator Larry Craig (R-ID) supported the resolution, in part, by 
arguing “As we know, for more than a decade Saddam Hussein has defied the international 
community, flagrantly ignoring and violating dozens of U.N. resolutions. It has become apparent 
to many Americans that the only way to end his historical defiance was to end his regime.”75 
Conversely, Senators who opposed (and ultimately voted against) S.J.Res. 46 frequently 
referenced the grave error of preemptively invading another country that had not yet attacked us 
(specifically Senators Byrd, Levin, Wyden, and Sarbanes). Affirming Hussein as an imminent 
threat helped counter this concern. Throughout the debate, literalizing the “threat” became 
common among pro-resolution Senators in addressing (though certainly not quelling) the qualms 
of a preemptive invasion. 
 On October 9th, Senator Byrd waged a serious allegation against other Senators whom he 
claimed were making erroneous connections between Iraq/Hussein and the September 11th 
attacks.76 Indeed, many scholars and critics have commented on how the Bush administration, as 
well as other politicians including Congress members and cabinet officials, conducted interviews 
and/or gave speeches that implied a link between Hussein and the radical Islamist militant 
organization Al-Qaeda.77 During the lead up to the invasion in 2003 and prior to the debate, 
President Bush alleged that Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and Al-Qaeda might conspire to 
launch terrorist attacks on the United States.78 The administration's rationale for war was, in part, 
based on this allegation and others.79 The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the 
United States, commonly known as the 9/11 Commission, concluded in 2004 that there was no 
evidence connecting Al-Qaeda to Hussein.80 On April 25, 2007, former Director of the Central 
Intelligence George Tenet disclosed that, "We could never verify that there was any Iraqi 
authority, direction, and control, complicity with al-Qaeda for 9/11 or any operational act against 
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America, period."81 On October 9th, Byrd asked the chamber, “Has anyone shown us any link 
between al Qaeda and Iraq? More than half of the American people, I would wager, believe that 
Iraqis carried out the attacks on the Twin Towers. Not a single Iraqi was among those attackers, 
those terrorists, those hijackers. There was not one Iraqi among -- in the whole group.”82 Senator 
Paul Sarbanes (D-MD) expressed agreement with the West Virginian Senator’s concern by 
asserting that “this administration continues to try to construe something as a link when there is 
no evidence that Saddam Hussein or Iraq had anything to do with Al-Qaeda and that attack.”83 
 Despite the erroneous evidence marring the administration’s subtle endorsement of this 
link, Congressional speeches during the debate often employed the Bush administration’s 
reasoning in support of S.J.Res.46. Senator Hatch (R-UT), on October 7th, argued that “with too 
many suggestions of Iraq's ties with terrorists like Al-Qaeda, and with no question about Iraq's 
animosity to the United States, and other countries as well, including many in the Middle East, 
should the United States consider an option of doing nothing, or too little, as we did with al-
Qaeda before September 11?”84 Hatch contended that preventing Iraq from accomplishing its 
“terroristic intentions”85 required giving Bush authorization to invade the country.  “I believe that 
this is President Bush's vision,”86 Hatch stated, giving greater credence to his argument by 
invoking Bush’s leadership on this crisis. Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC) spoke on October 9th and 
directly supported Hatch’s claim that Hussein may be supporting Al-Qaeda’s terrorist operations. 
Helms stated that what Hatch expressed was “a claim we all should be seriously considering,” 
adding that, “there have been contacts between senior Iraqi officials and members of Al-Qaeda. 
We know too that several of the detainees, in particular some high-ranking detainees, have said 
that Iraq provided some training to Al-Qaeda in chemical weapons.”87 The day before on 
October 9th Senator Bayh (D-IN) stated, “I believe there is little doubt he [Saddam Hussein] will 
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reach out to al-Qaeda or Hezbollah or other international institutions of terrorism to develop a 
deterrent to threaten us, with unacceptable consequences, if in the future we decide to restrain his 
aggressive actions.”88 And on the first day of the debate, October 4th, Senator Warner (R-VA) 
argued, “In this post-9/11 world, we as a nation cannot afford to wait while this evil dictator, 
who terrorizes his own people and shelters those who terrorize others--just think, al-Qaeda 
elements are now known to be within Iraq--acquires even more destructive capabilities to attack 
and terrorize our Nation, possibly his neighbors in the region and the entire world.”89 
 In total, 19 speeches of the 30 studied in this project indirectly suggested a connection 
between Al-Qaeda and Iraq/Hussein as seen in how the Senators employed the two in their 
sentence constructions; some suggestions were more explicit than others. It is important to note 
that Senators McCain, Nelson, Bayh, Hatch, Helms, Craig, and Nickles cited Secretary of 
Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s report that arrived shortly before the debate, on September 27, 2002. 
Rumsfeld declared that the CIA possessed “bulletproof” evidence demonstrating “there are, in 
fact, Al-Qaeda in Iraq.”90 In a review of about 600,000 documents related to the Iraq invasion, a 
military report released by the U.S. Joint Forces Command in 2008 contradicted Rumsfeld’s 
report.91 It found no “bulletproof” evidence that would indicate any relation between the Iraqi 
leader and the terrorist network. In a resolution considering military force against Iraq, 28 
speeches referenced the Afghanistan-native Al-Qaeda organization at least once. Twenty-five of 
those speeches referenced the now-discredited link between Al-Qaeda and Hussein as support for 
the resolution. 
 The allegation that Hussein and other members of his government conspired with 
terrorists tied to Al-Qaeda became a thread of support interwoven into arguments made by both 
Democratic and Republican Senators. This supporting material facilitated a conclusion that many 
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Senators at least referenced or alluded to in their speeches: The ultimate deployment of Weapons 
of Mass Destruction (WMD). Twenty-five of the thirty speeches studied used the term “Weapons 
of Mass Destruction” at least once. Senator Chuck Hagel (R-NE) argued on October 9th that 
while a preemptive invasion warranted greater legislative scrutiny than a country that had 
already attacked us, he cited Afghanistan’s terrorist network as an example, the “possibility of 
Weapons of Mass Destruction changes everything.”92 He went on to end his speech by stating, 
“Saddam Hussein’s ambitions for weapons of mass death means our commitment must extend 
beyond the day after to the months and years after Saddam is gone.”93 He argued that a sunset 
clause or a finite end to the invasion should not be added. On October 9th Senator Harry Reid (D-
NV), using the several U.N. Security Council violations that Hussein committed as evidence, 
proclaimed, “Iraq has refused to destroy its weapons of destruction. That refusal justified armed 
conflict.”94 Senator McCain (R-AZ), who followed Reid, made WMD the central focus of his 
October 9th remarks. McCain insisted that America must appreciate “that lesson from September 
11th; that we cannot wait until there is a direct, imminent, or sudden attack upon the United 
States of America.”95 A “clear and present danger” to national security came “in the form of 
Saddam Hussein’s inventory of weapons of mass destruction.”96 On the final day of the debate, 
Senate Minority Leader Trent Lott (R-MS) presented a unique speech in that he used the phrase 
WMD fifteen times throughout his speech—more than any other Senator in this study. The 
primary reason to go to war, as Lott explained, was because of Hussein’s WMD.97 In a move to 
hasten the vote on the resolution, Lott exclaimed that the possibility of WMD demanded the 
United States take action sooner rather than later. He argued, “I think we have had a full debate. 
To try to delay it another day, another week, is not going to be helpful. We need to stand up now, 
show we mean what we say, and we are going to get the results. . . .”98 
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 On October 10th, Senators Don Nickles (R-OK) and Jeff Sessions (R-AL) echoed Lott’s 
concern that delaying voting on the resolution only served to embolden Iraq. Nickles, who 
argued that Hussein was a vicious dictator that could only be neutralized by military force, 
blasted his colleagues who wanted to delay voting until after the 2002 midterm elections. He 
asked, “So for people who are saying we haven't been deliberative enough, and what is the 
consequence of this—what has changed?”99 Nickles went on to cite a 1998 Congressional debate 
that passed sanctions against Iraq for non-compliance with “international obligations,” 
contending that, “I don't remember the number of hours spent in debate, but it wasn't a lot. The 
fact is we passed it in one day.”100 Senator Byrd (D-WV) immediately responded to Nickles’ 
apparent dissatisfaction with the length of the debate by asking, “Why at this critical time, when 
we are discussing the most critical legislation we have had before the Senate this year, the most 
critical legislation we may have in a long time? We are not considering a 1994 or 1998 
resolution, we are considering a 2002 resolution. Yet we have been stampeded, we have been 
rushed, and it is unfair to the people of this country. Yet it has to be that way.”101 Senate 
Majority Leader Tom Daschle (D-SD) followed and agreed with Byrd’s call in elongating time 
to debate although for a different reason. Daschle explained that while it is clear that Hussein’s 
WMD formed an alarming threat that demanded an investigation, the Senate should also consider 
how “public support for military action can evaporate quickly if the American people come to 
believe they have not been given all of the facts because of limited debate.”102 
 The issue of time had been brought up in the days before October 10th. The media cited 
Byrd, in particular, as the loudest Senator on the issue of requesting more time to debate S.J.Res. 
46.103 Additionally, Senators Levin, Wyden, Daschle, Cleland, Bayh, Sarbanes, Hagel, and 
Kennedy all held that a longer debate would benefit, not a hinder, U.S. national interests. The 
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specific “interests” mentioned by each Senator varied, but two frequently surfaced among the 
speeches: cost and status. Cleland, for instance, argued on October 7 that the expense of the 
invasion needed to be better laid out by the administration. He likened his proposal to a “national 
invoice” of costs.104 Thus, Cleland argued for more time to deliberate to satisfy this request. On 
the interest of status, Senator Ted Kennedy (D-MA) spent a significant amount of time arguing 
that Congress should not only look at the material costs of invading Iraq but consider how it 
would shape America’s standing on the international stage. Before yielding the floor, he 
concluded his short speech by stating, “The world looks to America not just because of our 
superior might or economic weight; they admire us and emulate us because we are a friend and 
ally that defends freedom and promotes our values around the globe. Those same traits that are 
the envy of the world should guide us today as we conclude this important debate.”105 Senator 
Sarbanes, on October 9th, argued that the Senate should delay debate until after the election. He 
justified this recommendation on the basis of how a preemptive invasion is “fraught with danger 
both for our position in the world and for our leadership status.”106 Senator Daschle stressed that 
a substantial debate was not only permitted by extending time, but also was a responsibility of 
the chamber. He stated on the final day of the debate that, “In a healthy democracy such as ours, 
it is not only the right, but it is the duty of the ‘opposition party’ to fight for what it believes in. It 
is out of the process and discipline of reasoned and rigorous debate that strong and sound 
legislation and policy are shaped. Such debate is at the heart of the system of government created 
by our Founding Fathers.”107 
 Conversely, Senator Warner (R-VA) was among eight Republican Senators (with 
Voinovich, Bunning, Hatch, McCain, Lott, Sessions, and Hagel) who took a more explicit stance 
by arguing that S.J.Res. 46 would preserve or benefit America’s international status. These 
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Senators explained that the threat of Hussein and his stockpile of WMD demanded that the 
United States act now or face a deleterious blow to how other nations view America. For 
example, on October 4th Warner stated, “America's leadership and willingness to use force, 
confirmed by the Congress, is the best way to ensure compliance and preserve our status to the 
world.”108 Senator McCain on October 8th added that, “My strong conviction is that our best 
chance to preserve our status abroad is through strong American leadership. So the best chance 
for a peaceful outcome, the best chance for a united front with our allies and with the imprimatur 
of the U.N., I believe, is by giving a strong hand to the President to present Saddam Hussein with 
no alternative. . . .”109 On the other hand, Kennedy, Byrd, Daschle, Bayh, Sarbanes, and Reid 
explicitly mentioned America’s status or standing to stress the need for longer debate. While 
America’s “status” or “standing” likely carried different meanings to different Senators, it can be 
construed generally that they are addressing the way the United States was perceived by other 
nations.  
Conclusion 
 Upon completion of the final day scheduled for debate, October 10th, 2002, the Senate 
voted down any time extensions and rejected three proposed amendments that would limit the 
statuary scope of the resolution to delineate what type of “military force” would be authorized. 
S.J.Res. 46 passed 77-23; of the 24 Senators studied in this project, 19 Yeas and five Nays were 
recorded.110 The recurring thematic elements seen in the debate followed a similar pattern to 
other case studies observed in the literature review. First, the Senate primarily focused on either 
Iraq or Hussein as the primary agent regarding whom or what the military force would be used 
against. Many Senators who supported the resolution focused on decivilizing Hussein to 
demonstrate his threatening intentions and cited his violations of U.N. Security Council 
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resolutions as an affirmation of said threat. Senators wearier of the resolution mentioned 
Hussein’s evil nature, but did not play it up as much as their pro-resolution colleagues. These 
Senators also used the threat of a WMD-armed Hussein to stress the need for faster deliberation. 
These Senators, who included Voinovich, Craig, Warner, Kyl, Hatch, Domenici, Levin, Hagel, 
McCain, Nelson, Helms, Reid, and Sessions, explicitly stated that the Senate should not waste 
time confronting such an urgent threat. For instance, Kyl asserted that, “We cannot wait until we 
are sure that Iraq has a nuclear weapon and is about to use it because it is unlikely we will ever 
have that evidence, and it will be too late when we do.”111 And Nelson claimed that, “Saddam 
poses an immediate, unchecked threat to our Nation and our allies, and unless we act now his 
arsenal will only grow.”112 
  Second, the connection between Al-Qaeda and Iraq/Hussein also prevailed as a pro-war 
theme. Both Democratic and Republican Senators employed this faulty logic, often recycling the 
words used by President Bush or other administration officials in their speeches. The primary 
function of this connection was to build the case that Hussein was a terrorist because of the 
alleged links to terrorist networks throughout Afghanistan. While arguments that portrayed 
Hussein as barbaric relied on past evidence--including violations of international obligations, 
ignorance of U.S. condemnation in the 1980s and1990s, and state-sponsored genocide of Iraqi 
citizens--connecting Hussein to Al-Qaeda helped associate the leader to more contemporary 
patterns of barbarism. With the debates being held shortly after the first anniversary of 
September 11th, associating Hussein with the terrorist organization that was assumed responsible 
for the 9/11 attacks aided that connection. In a public poll presented on the final day of the 
debate, October 10th, 2002, 66% of survey participants said they believed “Saddam Hussein 
helped the terrorists in the September 12 attacks.”113 Less than a year after the debate, on 
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September 6th, 2003, a Washington Post poll found that 69% of Americans believed it was 
“likely. . . the Iraqi leader was personally involved in the attacks carried out by Al-Qaeda.”114  
 In all, after five days of debate, the Senate passed one of the most expansive military 
authorizations in recent American history. President Bush justified the decision to invade Iraq 
largely on the threats of WMD and Hussein’s ties to terrorism. Despite the problematic nature of 
the arguments for preemptive invasion, the Senate often cited and frequently recycled Bush’s 
arguments that relied on false allegations concerning WMD and Al-Qaeda-linked terrorism in 
Iraq. Of the thirty speeches studied, fifteen--by Senators Levin, Warner, Cleland, Hatch, Kyl, 
Nelson, Hagel, Helms, Sessions, Nickles, Lott, Hagel, McCain, Craig, and Bayh--referenced 
Bush, citing his “leadership” on the particular issue of the Iraq crisis and/or his arguments to 
invade Iraq, in support of S.J.Res. 46. Several Senators depicted Hussein as a decivilized threat, 
affirmed that threat with historical evidence, referenced the potential financial costs of the 
invasion and possible risks to U.S. status abroad, and all the while ignoring the requests made for 
extending debate time. In an effort to account for the arguments presented throughout the debate, 
this descriptive inventory traced the various trajectories observed. In the following chapter, 
attention turns from this inventory to elucidate the rhetorical implications stemming from the 
Senate’s debate. 
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Chapter Three: Analyzing the Metaphoric Clusters Present in the Senate’s Debate 
While the Senate’s debate over the decision to invade Iraq contained language that was at 
times strong and colorful, both Democrat and Republican Senators were in consensus that 
Saddam Hussein’s actions demanded attention. A majority of the Senators also agreed that no 
time extensions should be approved, with three separate amendments requesting said extensions 
having been rejected on October 4th, 2002, October 7th, 2002, and October 10th, 2002. These 
rejections came after certain speakers, most notably Senator Robert Byrd (D-WV), sought 
explicitly to postpone the debate until after the 2002 midterm elections. These two issues—
Hussein and time—were interwoven into several speeches Senators made as they debated for or 
against the resolution’s passage. The descriptive inventory developed in chapter two helps 
document these common threads. The inventory also revealed that an additional thread, that of 
U.S. status, was present in a majority of the speeches as well. Hussein, time, and status were 
often cited metaphorically. For example, as seen in chapter two, speakers frequently projected 
Hussein as savage and inhumane. Metaphor, therefore, is important for understanding this debate 
because it was a tactic that Senators commonly used in support or rejection of S.J.Res. 46.  
In this regard, scholars have examined metaphor as a rhetorical device capable of 
facilitating persuasion. William Franke, in his broad study of metaphor’s revival in recent 
decades, suggests that “the power of rhetoric to reshape cognitive meaning and to even reinvent, 
or at least reconfigure, reality” is regularly found in metaphor.1 When quantitatively measuring 
how participants, who were psychology students at the University of Southern California and 
disclosed that they were eligible to vote in national elections, assessed metaphors in political 
speeches, Stephen Read, Ian Cesa, David Jones, and Nancy Collins observed that employing 
metaphors can result in a more positive evaluation of a speech’s arguments, increased positive 
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views of the speaker, and a greater likelihood of attitude change.2 Robert Ivie adds that “nowhere 
is the temptation to literalize a fertile metaphor any stronger or more consequential than in 
deliberations about war and peace.”3 Indeed, war rhetoric frequently requires political leaders to 
paint a crises or event as worthy of immediate and stern action. Imagery imparted through 
metaphor is a strategy that Presidents have used to justify warfare.4 Metaphor's ability to shape 
reality offers an expedient opportunity for politicians seeking quick foreign policy action. 
Benjamin Bates, in a study of President George H. W. Bush’s Persian Gulf war addresses, noted 
that the President’s war rhetoric was “shown to be persuasive” to international audiences.5 
George H. W. Bush employed metaphors of savagery to define Saddam Hussein and increase 
international support for the Persian Gulf War. Bates concluded that metaphors can, "reshape 
public perceptions of the enemy so that there is no alternative to war.”6 While the Senate’s 
rhetoric is the artifact of study for this project, many of the ideas and arguments disseminated by 
the George W. Bush administration were often recycled in the Senate’s debate. Within the 
broader context of the Iraq crisis, metaphor is particularly relevant because many Senators 
employed them in their speeches. Filtering the debate through a metaphoric lens aligns with prior 
research. During times of war or crisis, political leaders often decivilize7 enemies through 
metaphors. This chapter is outlined into three major sections. The first section explicates why a 
metaphoric analysis serves this thesis best and the steps necessary to conduct it. Second, the 
analysis is executed and the metaphorical concepts, or clusters of metaphors, are identified, 
documented, and explained. The chapter then concludes with a summary and discussion of those 
clusters. 
 Robert Ivie’s work is a helpful guide to the thesis’ analysis. In one particular piece that 
was examined in the literature review, Ivie investigated how metaphors influenced pro-war 
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discourse during the War of 1812 between the United States and Britain.8 Identifying metaphor 
as a “master trope,” he analyzed how four in particular played out during the war. These included 
the use of decivilizing vehicles, affirmation of threatening expectations, the suggestion of 
rational demonstrations, and the subversion of competing perspectives.9 As was observed in the 
prior chapter, Senators frequently employed two metaphorical strains—decivilizing vehicles and 
affirmation of threatening expectations—in their arguments. Analyzing only these strains, 
however, would provide an incomplete assessment of the debate. 
 Other work by Ivie helps to provide a more in-depth examination of S.J.Res. 46. In his 
research on Cold War rhetoric, Ivie noted that identifying key metaphors is necessary to unearth 
the motives, or “interpretations of reality,”10 that speakers forward in their speeches. He writes, 
“The value of locating underlying metaphors is in revealing their limits or untapped potential as 
sources of invention, something that is far more difficult to accomplish when a generating term is 
allowed to operate without being explicitly acknowledged as such.”11 Metaphor can exaggerate 
an event, a place, or person. It can connote new meaning to an object or actor in a way that is 
condensed and easy to understand. Metaphor can communicate complex concepts quickly and 
clearly. When considering the use of metaphor in policy deliberations, George Lakoff and Mark 
Johnson argue that it is entrenched within American political language. For example, they 
examined the metaphor “argument is war.”12 That is, American western culture tends to argue 
using terms of warfare. “Your claims are indefensible. He attacked every weak point in my 
argument. I demolished his argument”; these examples by Lakoff and Johnson help demonstrate 
how an analysis on American foreign policy rhetoric benefits from acknowledging the 
metaphor’s power. “Many of the things we do in arguing are partially structured by the concept 
of war. It is one that we live by in this culture; it structures the actions we perform in arguing.”13 
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 On the process of metaphoric criticism, Ivie writes that a critic should group metaphors 
into clusters and analyzes each cluster individually.14 This “clustering” approach produces 
metaphorical concepts that help unearth relevant patterns present in a text or series of texts. 
These patterns can then direct the critic to a speaker’s “master metaphors, which more often than 
not are the essential terms of the speaker’s ‘terministic screen.’”15 The terministic screen is a 
concept coined by Kenneth Burke to describe how language systems affect a person’s perception 
of their reality.16 In his original essay on this concept, Burke asks readers to consider various 
photos of the same object. These photos had unique looks to them because of the different lenses 
used in the camera. Burke uses the camera lenses as a metaphor to explain how terministic 
screens operate. Perception changes depending on the lenses we use to observe them. Language 
shapes the way a certain object is perceived. So while Saddam Hussein was the sovereign leader 
of the Republic of Iraq, he was perceived as a savage dictator by every Senator that referenced 
him. These linguistic lenses affect and determine the way actors perceive and interpret the world 
and the objects within that world. A terministic screen thereby relies on the various terms used. 
Clustering as a method is helpful in grouping these terms that can then be useful for analysis. As 
a methodological process that can provide significant insight into the Senate’s debate, this thesis 
employs metaphoric criticism. 
This process requires five steps, three of which unfold in this chapter. The first two steps 
refer to what has already taken place in the two prior chapters; situating oneself within the 
context of the artifact(s) being studied and selecting representative texts to engage in close 
readings of. For example, in his review of Cold War rhetoric, Ivie explained that he found 
“terministic networks” of metaphors by “examining sets of messages in various contexts.”17 
These included the speeches and remarks of political leaders relevant to the scope of his project. 
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In what is comparative to the descriptive inventory developed in chapter two, the thirty texts 
selected from the Senate’s debate represents the second step. The critic then reads these texts and 
“encounters the terms that are most obviously figurative. As these clusters of vehicles become 
more refined, the critic begins to examine their interaction throughout the text to determine how 
they function as a system of conceptual metaphors.”18   
The third step, where Ivie cites Kathleen Hall Jamieson,19 is to cluster the metaphorical 
concepts featured in the discourse of interest. That is, outline a system of terms, or clusters, that 
represent the recurring themes observed. Ivie explains that one should divide the metaphors 
based on their meanings, or "similar 'entailments,’" into subgroups.20 These subgroups are, 
arguably, the speaker's metaphorical concepts, or clusters. This leads to the fourth and fifth steps, 
where the critic compiles separate files of these subgroups to then evaluate them individually. 
Ivie writes, “Attention is focused on prevailing patterns. With this fifth step completed, the critic 
is in a position to assess both the limits and untapped potential of the metaphorical system 
guiding the speakers’ arguments.”21 The finished version of each metaphorical concept cluster 
includes the “various incarnations” of that metaphorical concept.22 The critic can then analyze 
the texts through these clusters and trace the unique terministic screen that they produce. In 
Ivie’s case, he selected five speeches by Henry A. Wallace’s third-party presidential campaign 
run in 1948.23 As he read through each speech, he documented recurring patterns and the terms 
used to convey each theme. The GAME cluster, for instance, was identified by Ivie as 
“comprising terms such as ‘game,’ ‘race,’ ‘cards,’ etc.”24 Similarly, I took the themes identified 
in chapter two’s inventory and asked, what are the markers of these themes? This led to 
discovering the terms that are explicated below, of which are categorized into the following 
clusters: FORCE, TIME, and STATUS. Various terms unique to each grouping emerged as the 
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speeches were studied. I identified these terms, documented their position within each speech, 
and began categorizing them into separate files. These three clusters acted as reservoirs that the 
Senators frequently drew from to justify the invasion, extend or delay debate time, and/or 
reference how American global leadership status would be affected by either supporting or 
rejecting S.J.Res. 46. 
FORCE Cluster 
 The FORCE cluster serves as the dominant cluster in the Senate’s debate, as observed by 
the number of Senators who drew from it. This grouping comprises terms such as “bullied” or 
“bully,” “kicked,” “forced,” “cornered,” and “aggression” to help define the acts performed by 
the adversary Saddam Hussein. Metaphors of FORCE imply a fight for control. The enemy is 
trying to exert pressure or control over the United States or its allies, and America must respond 
so as to maintain its own independence and standing. For example, Ivie’s study of the War of 
1812 revealed that pro-war Republicans compared Great Britain’s behavior as tantamount to “re-
colonizing America.”25 Ivie noted that it was not only the word choices themselves that helped 
define the FORCE metaphors, but also the tone that they emitted. For instance, he explained that 
these Republicans made America appear as if it had “been ‘bullied,’ ‘kicked,’ ‘trampled,’ 
‘trodden,’ and ‘pounded’ by Great Britain.”26 This projection contributed to an “overall vision of 
malevolence” that in turn “put the worst possible construction on British policies and motives 
without mentioning settlements, the shifting course of negotiation, and possible alternative 
interpretations of British intentions.”27 In her work on President George W. Bush’s War on 
Terror, Carol Winkler compared Bush’s rhetoric against Iraq to President Ronald Reagan’s 
rhetoric on invading Grenada.28 Winkler quoted Bush as stating, "They stand against us because 
we stand in their way."29 The enemy's forcefulness required the United States to respond with 
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equal or greater ferocity. Winkler contended that the U.S. was not the first aggressor, thereby 
presenting the U.S. not as the initiator of military force, but as the victim trying to defend itself. 
Bush made it clear the U.S. would employ military efforts as necessary to protect itself. "This 
country will define our times, not be defined by them,”30 as Winkler cited Bush as stating. 
FORCE is characterized by its linguistic choices of power and physical abuse. It is these choices 
that help outline the FORCE cluster. 
Republican and Democratic Senators alike recalled Hussein’s forceful and abusive past, 
most notably his government’s invasion of Kuwait. Senators Levin (D-MI), John Warner (R-
VA), Ron Wyden (D-OR), Orrin Hatch (R-UT), Bill Nelson (D-FL), John McCain (R-AZ), 
Robert Byrd (D-WV), Tom Daschle (D-SD), and Trent Lott (R-MS) all mentioned the 1991 
Persian Gulf War as an example of Hussein’s violent history. Senator Warner argued that, 
“Almost 12 years later, we are still waiting for Iraq to comply with international mandates. 
Hussein and his regime need a very strict set of resolutions in order to prevent any comparable 
use of aggression by his forces beyond his borders.”31 Senator Daschle contended, “And we 
know Saddam Hussein is committed to one day possessing nuclear weapons. If that should 
happen, instead of simply bullying the gulf region, as he did in the past, he could dominate it.”32 
Senator Warner, upon referencing the Persian Gulf War as indicative of Hussein’s abusive past, 
also depicted Hussein as a “brute” and “evil dictator.”33 He stated that, “Saddam Hussein brutally 
invaded Kuwait in August of 1990. In the ensuing Persian Gulf war, he was decisively defeated 
on the battlefield by the coalition of forces in that heroic battle of roughly 100 hours.”34 Senator 
Wyden compared the Iraqi government to a cartel and that his regime “threatens our nation’s 
economy and security.”35 Similarly, Daschle ended his speech by stating, “There is no question 
that Saddam Hussein is a dangerous man who has done barbaric things.”36 
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 Once it was established that Hussein’s actions were reprehensible, the connection 
between his behavior and his character was easier to argue. Indeed, every Senator that mentioned 
Hussein referred to specific actions he committed first, followed by a broader assessment of his 
character. Comparing the Iraqi leader to a beast, a predator, and a menace, several Senators did 
not mince words on Hussein’s evil nature during the debate. This depiction was further 
supported by the observation that not a single speaker studied in this project referred to him 
positively. Rather, every sentence or paragraph that mentioned Hussein associated his character 
or behavior with one of the following qualifiers: “threat,” “negative,” “evil,” “wicked,” 
“malicious,” “villainous,” “murderer,” or “corrupt.” Presenting Hussein in this manner made him 
appear guilty. The language used to describe his behavior helped literalize the metaphor of force 
so as to outline a military invasion against a country that had not directly attacked us appear 
more palatable. Assailing Hussein’s character also raised suggestions of his diabolical motives. 
For instance, Senator Domenici (R-NM), after comparing Hussein to a multi-headed beast, asked 
the chamber, “Do we really know what he could do to America? Are we really sure?”37 
Connecting Hussein’s goals to his coercive behavior helped present a conclusion that his actions 
and his intentions were identical. With Hussein’s past abuses confirmed and his alleged 
conspiracy with Al-Qaeda being lent credence by then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s 
assurance that the CIA possessed bulletproof evidence on this matter,38 or Collin Powell’s speech 
to the United Nations arguing that Hussein had Weapons of Mass Destruction,39 pro-resolution 
Senators were able to condition the debate in their favor. 
 Within this cluster, it is also important to note that two types of forces became apparent 
as the debate progressed: negative force and positive force. Negative force is defined by its 
damaging depictions of antagonists. Ivie describes it as “that which violated rules and laws and 
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consequently was destructive.”40 It implies negative consequences if said force was not 
neutralized or contained. Consider Ned O’Gorman’s study on how the Dwight Eisenhower 
administration began shifting U.S. foreign policy rhetoric away from a defensive strategy of 
“containing” communism to a more offensive strategy of “liberation.”41 O’Gorman argues that it 
is difficult to contain communism because it is an ideological spirit, one that he observes as 
having being framed as a negative force. The insidious nature of communism demanded a policy 
that freed the people of its manipulation.42 Negative force can be viewed similarly, where 
Senators would link the insidious nature of terrorism to Hussein’s actions through their word 
choices. Conversely, positive force not only imbues righteous qualities to an actor or agent, but 
also suggests that the actor or agent would use those qualities to eradicate any negative forces.43 
The United States was frequently positioned as that positive force. 
Every Senator charged Hussein as a negative entity that threatened global security. When 
describing Hussein or his government as a threat, twenty Senators employed the specific term 
“force.”44 Senator Nelson, for instance, narrated a story when he described Hussein’s threat as a 
“force not to be reckoned with.”45 He expressed his concern when he stated, “I fear we have not 
yet heard enough about what Iraq will look like when the smoke clears.”46 Senator Hatch added 
that, “From this perspective, I believe that the frightening force of Saddam’s chemical and 
biological weapons pose a threat to the region, and to the stability of the Gulf, and therefore to 
our vital national interests.”47 Not only were Hussein’s character and actions condensed into 
simple, villainous terms, but he was further compressed into an almost abstract-like force. 
Senator Bunning described that President George W. Bush should have “every tool at his 
disposal to prevail in this struggle with evil.”48 The Senate’s debate literalized Hussein from 
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being an elected President of a country that had yet to attack the United States into a malevolent 
force that could not be dismissed. 
 Conversely, the United States was frequently framed as a positive force. Every Senator, 
whether they supported the resolution or not, spoke of the United States in this fashion. Twelve 
Senators—Byrd, Carl Levin (D-MI), Jeff Sessions (R-AL), George Voinovich (R-OH), Warner, 
Max Cleland (D-GA), Hatch, Jon Kyl (R-AZ), Nelson, Evan Bayh (D-IN), Joe Lieberman (D-
CT), and McCain—defined the United States as being a virtuous agent capable of neutralizing 
Hussein. Senator Sessions argued that, “And while as leaders of the people of the United States 
we must focus primarily on the just national security interests of our country, we, as enlightened, 
moral and decent people, ought to ask ourselves, whether our actions will ultimately benefit the 
world and even our adversary. When the status quo presents more dangers than the war the most 
just, the most logical, the most moral thing is to fight.”49 Presenting the United States as 
righteous helped project a dichotomy that resembled the Cold War era. Similar to how it was the 
United States and democracy against the U.S.S.R and communism, it was now the United States 
and freedom against Iraq and terrorism. The invasion was also often regarded as a struggle, 
implying that America was, as Senator Byrd claimed, “fighting the good fight.”50 This reinforced 
America’s image as a positive power as we struggled to “win this good war against terrorism,” as 
Senator Wyden contended.51 
 The “FORCE” cluster provided a damning assessment of Hussein. Saddam was not only 
brutal as evinced in his actions but was also innately evil. His appetite for terrifying weapons 
was insatiable and his hostility could neither be contained nor appeased. The image was virtually 
self-confirming. Citing Hussein’s past helped Senators narrate, and subsequently literalize, his 
future motives. Having established the premise that a brutal dictator drove Iraq, pro-resolution 
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Senators were then able to craft a persuasive logic in their favor: Hussein was evil, America 
good, and the invasion just.  
TIME Cluster 
 The TIME cluster included terms that addressed two different concerns: the length of the 
debate and the prospective length of the invasion. Before dissecting each concern, it is important 
to explain what the TIME cluster entails. During moments of national crisis, Presidents and other 
political leaders often employ arguments that highlight the urgency of a situation.52 Following 
the September 11th, 2001 terrorist attacks, the urgency was defined by President Bush as, in part, 
righting the injustices of terrorists as soon as possible and preventing future attacks from 
occurring.53 Similarly, many Senators argued that time was essential. Having established that 
Hussein was an evil entity, how could we not neutralize that entity as soon as possible? Times of 
crisis are not times of discussion and debate. While only a brief line from his extensive work on 
presidential crisis rhetoric is cited, Jim Kuypers found that this type of rhetoric in the post-Cold 
War era often sidelines deliberation. He stated, "By announcing the crisis, the president asks for 
his decision to be supported, not for debate upon what should be done.”54 Many pro-resolution 
Senators pointed out that the five days designated for debate could be emboldening the enemy. 
Debate was, for these Senators, a hindrance rather than a benefit. On the other hand, anti-
resolution Senators would conclude that not enough time was being allotted for an issue of this 
importance. They would use terms that labeled such urgency as hasty, not prudent, behavior.  
Time was spoken of as constituting more than just minutes or seconds.  
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The five days that the Senate debated S.J.Res. 46 were no longer just hours on a clock. Senator 
Jon Kyl (R-AZ) argued that the debate was a “time bomb” that would encourage Saddam 
Hussein. Kyl argued:  
Consider having this debate a few months or years from now after we've 
ascertained that he definitely has a nuclear saber to rattle. This will make a 
move against Saddam, or any other American action in the Middle East, more 
dangerous, and in all probability, less likely. It is Saddam's dream come true. 
He will be able to check our actions. Postponing the debate until after the 
elections is ludicrous. Our decision on this matter is pressing. Our decision 
on this matter can be a time bomb that can explode in our faces. So, again, 
the time to act is now.55 
Time is a metaphor because Kyl no longer treats it as a measurement of change. Rather, 
he imbues time with tangible qualities. Senator John McCain (R-AZ) stressed that the chamber 
“should not be wasting and throwing away the taxpayer’s time and money” by prolonging debate 
beyond October 10th, 2002. Time also had worth, similar to the metaphor “Time is Money.” 
Senators supporting the resolution argued that time was short, which implied quantity, and 
therefore valuable in preserving. Those wearier of the resolution contended that not enough time 
was being held to debate. Time ultimately became a commodity. These linguistic choices are 
useful markers in identifying this cluster. 
The debate length itself was frequently referred to as either incomplete in discussion or 
demanding in resolve. For example, every Senator who voted against the resolution in this 
study—Senators Byrd, Levin, Wyden, Paul Sarbanes (D-MD), and Ted Kennedy (D-MA)—
questioned why the resolution was not receiving more debate time. Within this group, Senator 
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Byrd was the most vocal. In every speech he delivered, Byrd brought up his concern that the 
Senate was not debating longer the merits of S.J.Res. 46. In one instance he asked, “Why is the 
President telling Congress it has to act before the elections? Why are our own leaders telling us 
we have to act before the elections? What are we signing up for?”56 Byrd likened the resolution 
to a blank check in an effort to raise awareness of how much power the President would receive 
and how consideration of that power necessitated greater attention. He asked, “We are about to 
give the President a blank check to deal with Iraq however he sees fit. What exactly is he 
planning to do with this power?”57 Even Senator Hagel, who ultimately voted for the resolution’s 
passage, stated, “I regret that this vote will take place under the cloud and pressure of elections 
next month. Some are already using the Iraq issue to gain advantage in political campaigns. It 
might have been better for our vote to have been delayed until after the election. . . .”58  
 Words like “rushed,” “hasty,” “quick,” and “rash” were used to describe the debate as 
incomplete. Interestingly, these words were often employed in metaphors that would compare 
the debate as fluid-like. Senator Daschle, who agreed and even specifically cited Byrd’s 
trepidations, contended, “We do know from our own national experience, however, that public 
support for military action can evaporate quickly if the American people come to believe they 
have not been given all of the facts. This debate should not evaporate as quickly as public 
support can.”59 Senator Nelson, concerned that not enough statements have been heard on the 
resolution, likened his uncertainty on S.J.Res. 46 to smoke. He stated, “As a member of the 
Armed Services Committee, I have heard many hours of testimony from administration officials 
outlining their case for war. But I fear we have not yet heard enough about what Iraq will look 
like when the smoke clears. The smoke of uncertainty looming on a war against Iraq may be 
clouding this chamber’s judgment.”60 The “thick haze of war,” as Senator Sarbanes warned, 
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could stifle meaningful debate and, as Byrd had suggested before him, a vote on the resolution 
should be postponed until after the November 2002 midterm elections.61 He warned that moving 
too quickly on a resolution this significant could mean “. . . . moving down the path of asserting 
a unilateral preemptive prerogative, in effect, asserting our right to do what we want anywhere, 
anytime, to anyone.”62 
 Conversely, fifteen Senators referred to the debate’s length as excessive.63 These 
Senators frequently used terms like “fully,” “complete,” “quick,” to define the five days allowed 
to the resolution’s debate as ample. Additionally, advocates used “disruption,” “obstacle,” 
“hindrance,” and “impediment” to describe the debate as either obstructing President Bush’s 
executive power as Commander-in-Chief or threatening national security. Senator Lott, 
appearing fed up at the surfeit of time spent on debating S.J.Res. 46, stated on the final day of the 
debate, “I believe this issue has been aired fully. It is not new. We have been worrying about 
this, talking about this, and debating the seriousness of the threat from Saddam Hussein and his 
weapons of mass destruction for years--really, for 11 years. So Senators know what the issue is. 
We have seen, yesterday, Senators from both parties moving toward giving the President the 
authority to do this job.”64 Senator McCain explained that “the threat is not new”65 while Senator 
Bayh argued that extending debate time would “be a major impediment to the use of military 
force against an armed and dangerous Iraq.”66 In an attempt to hasten debate, the threatening 
nature of Iraq—which was established through the decivilizing metaphors used to dehumanize 
Hussein and his government—aided pro-resolution Senators to argue for a faster vote on S.J.Res. 
46. 
 Many speakers addressed the prospective length of the invasion as a recurring topic. 
Senators from both parties frequently spoke of the length as an “unknown,” a “commitment,” a 
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“dedication,” an “obligation,” a “liability,” or a “perseverance.” Senator Hagel warned that “War 
is too serious, the human price too high, and the implications unknown.”67 Ten Senators used the 
term “commitment” in reference to the invasion.68 Senator Byrd, for instance, asked, “Are the 
American people ready to make that kind of long-term regional commitment?”69 And, on the 
final day of the debate, he seemed disappointed in the time spent on deliberating S.J.Res. 46. 
Byrd explained that, “The Senate is a great institution, but somehow I think we are failing. We 
are failing to educate the people. Why? Because we do not want to spend enough time. How 
much time have we spent on this resolution as of yesterday at 4 p.m.? A little over 25 hours on 
this bill--25 hours. Why, many of the larger municipalities in this country would spend a week 
on an application for a sewer permit. And here we spend 2 days?--that is what it amounts to, 25 
hours--and we are ready to quit.”70  
 For a preemptive invasion, the question of commitment is particularly significant. A 
majority of the Senators either mentioned the length of the debate as sufficient enough, bordering 
on excessive, or already excessive. Interestingly, several of these Senators either ignored or 
criticized any attempts at extending debate time. However, they were still concerned with the 
significant commitment that an invasion would bring. In one jarring example, Senator Lott stated 
on the final day of the debate, “Having had a full debate, I feel confident about holding a vote. 
There has been thoughtful discussion on both sides of the issue. Invading Iraq is an unknown 
feat, and it can bring unknown challenges, but I think we have had a full debate. To try to delay 
it another day, another week, is not going to be helpful.”71  
 In many ways, pro-resolution Senators often refuted any requests to lengthen or postpone 
debate time in a melodramatic tone. Senator Kyl recounted that Hussein’s “murderous 
rampage”72 against his own citizens warranted a hastened debate. He stated, “There have been 
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reports of bodies of victims left in the street or returned to families bearing clear marks of torture 
every month. Imagine the next country to face Hussein’s wrath. Imagine Americans facing that 
unspeakable horror.”73 Several Senators went into significant detail into how victims—both 
actual victims in Iraq and potential victims back home in the United States—would be affected 
by a lengthy debate. Senator Jim Bunning (R-KY) cited Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait to 
describe how, “He has had his followers assassinate opponents in Iraq and abroad.  During the 
Gulf War, his regime beat and tortured Americans and used them as `Human Shields.’” We 
cannot afford to wait anymore. It is time for us to act. It is time for us to be bold.”74 Senator 
Warner, when discussing the ongoing war in Afghanistan, urged the Senate to consider “the 
valiant efforts of our troops today in Afghanistan, where the casualties, fortunately, are in the 
100s to 200s so far in their heroic efforts to turn the tide of terrorism. Let us continue that effort 
in Iraq. It is with a sense of deep emotion I deliver these remarks today in support of this 
resolution which I was privileged with others to draw.”75  
As was seen above, Senators would often exaggerate the crisis. This exaggeration reflects 
certain properties of political crisis rhetoric, where several debaters stressed and described the 
death toll that were affected under Hussein’s regime to increase urgency. Herbert Simons, in his 
discussion of the rhetorical history behind the invasion of Iraq, argued that threat-induced crisis 
rhetoric can provide politicians with policy support on a variety of issues.76 The conflict with 
Hussein’s government was not only presented in simplistic terms of positive forces versus 
negative forces, but was used to support arguments favoring immediate action. A melo-dramatic 
framing of the Iraq crisis by the Bush administration, as Simons details in his essay, likely aided 
Senators in continuing that framing into their debate.77 Amplifying and overstating Hussein’s 
threatening nature implied that time was short. Not only was Hussein a savage, but ten Senators 
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went further and detailed that savagery.78 Citing reports on the body counts that rose under 
Hussein’s regime and the blood shed because of his actions animated the TIME cluster. 
Dramatically emphasizing the gory specifics of Hussein’s behavior implied that the chamber 
should not wait or postpone passing S.J.Res. 46. 
 Invading Iraq was a peculiar effort since it meant preemptively deploying military forces 
against a country that had yet to directly assault the United States. Accessible documentary 
records, interviews and recollections of Bush administration officials, and the growing body of 
testimony and materials various sources—like the U.S. Joint Forces Command—, support the 
argument that the United States went to war in Iraq without clear consideration of whether war 
was a proper recourse.79 Simons adds that “from the outset, it seemed, consideration of invading 
Iraq occasioned more debate than usual.”80 Being a war of choice, S.J.Res. 46 warranted longer 
consideration. Yet despite a few Senators requesting more debate time, or to postpone debate 
until after the elections, the resolution passed with only a total of 51 Senators having participated 
over the course of five days.  
STATUS Cluster 
 The final cluster observed in the debate referred to America’s leadership and standing on 
the world stage, termed here the country’s STATUS. The perception of the United States abroad 
is a significant concern to politicians. This cluster references the idea that American strength and 
leadership demands perseverance, especially during times of crisis. Referring back to Carol 
Winkler’s piece on Reagan’s Grenada campaign and Bush’s Iraq rhetoric, she noted that both 
presidents used language that sought to bolster America’s stature on the world stage during the 
crisis their country faced. She observed that both Grenada and Iraq were positioned as enemies in 
speeches made by Reagan and Bush. These enemies would be victorious if America relinquished 
  
77 
 
its standing to other countries by not responding with military might. By doing nothing, 
"America’s posture grows fearful, retreating from the world and forsaking our friends.”81 The 
STATUS grouping is marked by terms that represent the desire to protect or maintain America’s 
international stature. Both pro-resolution and anti-resolution Senators disclosed that they were 
interested in defending U.S. perception abroad. Anti-resolution speakers did not want an 
unsuccessful military invasion to occur because failure would likely damage America’s 
reputation. Conversely, pro-resolution Senators would use the same words from the STATUS 
cluster to argue that is precisely for reasons like the Iraq crisis that we had intervene in order to 
uphold our reputation. The cluster included “power,” “rank,” “leadership,” “status,” “standing,” 
“stature,” “influence,” and “reputation.” Debaters frequently associated images of U.S. 
leadership with the positive force of military deployment. As Warner explained, President Bush 
needed military force to demonstrate “extraordinary American leadership.”82 Sarbanes added that 
equipping Bush with this force could help to “re-affirm our long standing principle of leadership 
by aiding our allies and neutralizing our enemies.”83 Invading Iraq transformed into an 
opportunity to sustain strong U.S. standing abroad.  
 Discussions of morality and national duty buttressed the arguments made by several pro-
resolution Senators. For example, Senator Kyl referenced America’s involvement in past wars to 
justify its involvement in Iraq. He stated that it “is no accident that the oppressed peoples of the 
world look at us, rather than other countries or the U.N., as their ray of hope. It is no accident 
that it devolved to us to end German imperialism in World War I, stop Adolf Hitler in World 
War II, and defeat the forces of international communism in the Cold War. That is why we lead, 
and why we must lead.”84 “Leadership” was the most commonly cited term under this cluster, 
where its usage equated exclusively to American leadership. Senator Bayh contended that, “It is 
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only with American leadership and taking a strong hand in this instance that we will receive the 
kind of united allied support we seek.”85 And Senator Craig claimed that equipping the President 
with Congressional authorization would fulfill America’s responsibility as a global leader. He 
stated, “It is called the responsibility of leadership. It is recognized as the role we play in the 
world today.”86 In total, seventeen speeches employed the phrase “U.S. leadership” or 
“American leadership.”87  
 The STATUS cluster associated U.S. stature with external leadership abroad and internal 
image perception among the Senators. That is, upholding a positive image of global leadership 
was not only acquired by invading Iraq and, by implication, the success of S.J.Res. 46, but to go 
against that resolution would also bet against that image. Consider Senator Cleland’s statements, 
“I want to single out the leadership of my President in calling the country’s and the Senate’s 
attention to the dangers of an armed Iraq. And this objective, the disarming of Saddam Hussein, 
is the objective which this Senate, this Congress is prepared to overwhelmingly endorse as we 
close ranks behind the President.”88 Refusing to support S.J.Res. 46 soon became tantamount to 
undermining American leadership. How could one refuse to support our President? How could 
the Senate deny what Senator Hagel exclaimed was a “constitutional responsibility and an 
institutional obligation”89 to disarm Hussein? Neutralizing the threat Iraq posed was intimately 
tied to U.S. leadership. “The perception of American power is power,” as Hagel continued in his 
speech, “and how our power is perceived can either magnify or diminish our influence in the 
world.”90 
 Status was also frequently associated with U.S. service women and men. Historically, 
American foreign policy rhetoric has seen the exploitation of U.S. soldiers in an effort to rally 
public support behind a war.91 Military might has been a powerful marker of American 
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nationalism in the 21st century, where supporting the troops has become synonymous with 
supporting the country. Although this has not always been the case—consider the backlash that 
American soldiers whom fought in the Vietnam War faced upon their return—the recent Iraq 
crisis saw a revival of troop lionization in that their service was to be unquestioned and their 
sacrifices memorialized. Depicting Hussein as a savage not only positioned U.S. leadership as a 
positive force, but by extension its military as well. Senator Hatch stated, “I believe that every 
member of this body will fully support our President, his leadership on this matter, and our 
Armed Forces.”92 Senator Daschle argued that not involving ourselves in Iraq would “. . . . have 
profound consequence for our Nation, for our allies, for the war on terror, and perhaps most 
importantly, for the men and women in our Armed Forces who’s legitimacy would be 
questioned.”93 Senator Cleland stated, “I will be supporting the resolution backed by the 
President and opposing the alternatives because I believe it is imperative that we now speak with 
one voice to Saddam Hussein, to the entire international community and, most importantly, to 
our servicemen and women.”94 Cleland seemingly implied that speaking against the resolution, 
as a few Senators chose to do, would have a deleterious effect to our troops. Supporting the 
resolution meant upholding our status as a world leader and, consequently, the troops that aided 
those efforts. 
 With a total of twenty speeches employing the term “troops,” this choice reveals the 
debate’s more emotional character. A variety of alternatives existed, of course, and a few 
Senators indeed used “Armed Forces” or “Soldiers,” when referring to the military. However, no 
other descriptor came close to the frequency that the word “troops” experienced. “Troops” 
produces a unique effect in that it softens the relationship between public citizens and military 
service members. Rather than demarcating the clear difference between a public citizen and a 
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military official, a distinction that is reflected in the Founding Fathers decision to delegate the 
tasks of Commander of the Armed Forces to a public civilian, the term “troops” helps bridge that 
gap. Placing the military within the metonym of “troops” disrupts the hierarchical structure that 
has traditionally defined the military. This effort was aided as several Senators often used the 
phrase “our men and women” immediately or soon after using the specific term “troops.” 
Projecting the military not as a militia capable of death and destruction but as a humanized 
assembly of “men and women” distances the soldier from its horrific duties. In this capacity, it is 
easier to support the troops and the particular mission they are on.  
 The term “troops” carries significant implications for the Senate’s deliberation. In his 
study of the genealogy behind the ideograph <Support Our Troops>, rhetorical critic Roger Stahl 
argues that this phrase “anchors the soldier at the center of war discourse, calling civic attention 
away from the point of policy’s deliberation and toward its point of execution.”95 If America’s 
status is tied to its military and its troops, the Iraq invasion was an opportunity to reinforce that 
status abroad. Further, many Senators constructed their speech in a way that assumed the 
invasion was a sealed deal. Senator Byrd, angry that the chamber had seemingly already made up 
its mind, exclaimed, “It seems the course of destiny has already been set by this Senate.”96 While 
various factors likely affected his statement, focusing on the military drew attention away the 
complexities of S.J.Res. 46. By continuously referencing the troops, the invasion had ostensibly 
begun and to back out would mean surrendering. Senator Nickles, drawing parallels between the 
1998 Persian Gulf resolution and the 2002 Iraq resolution, argued that “our troops, our dear men 
and women” deserve a unified voice “going into Iraq.”97 He concluded his speech by stating 
“Congress spoke in a united fashion in 1998. It was proud to be part of that then, and I am proud 
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to be part of the sponsorship of this resolution, which I believe will also pass with a very strong 
voice. . . .”98  
 STATUS is a cluster that is closely tied to American exceptionalism, a concept that, as 
Philip Wander noted, has influenced many foreign policy decisions in our history.99 Though the 
meaning behind American exceptionalism has changed over time, the bedrock belief that 
America is exceptional still rings true today. It has helped forge defining moments in American 
history, moments that several Senators often cited in their speech. Referring to America’s 
greatness during the Civil War or both World Wars aided arguments in favor of S.J.Res. 46 
because Iraq was frequently positioned as another Nazi Germany or Soviet Union. This cluster 
contributed in positively spinning the invasion not in terms of cost or human sacrifice, but in 
terms of stature and leadership.  
Conclusion 
 Against the backdrop of the September 11th, 2001 terrorist attacks, Senators were 
mobilized to not only approve President Bush with military force against Afghanistan in 2001, 
but were asked again to approve his request in disarming a dangerous Iraq. In order for the 
President to call upon Congress to imbue him with authorization, he and his administration 
began a concerted rhetorical campaign shortly after the terrorist attacks to garner public support 
for his War on Terror. This campaign, marked by speeches from top cabinet members like 
Secretary of State Colin Powell and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, expressed key terms 
that were later recycled in the Senate’s debate. In this capacity, pro-resolution Senators 
ostensibly became a surrogate for Bush on the chamber floor. Presidential rhetoric is influential, 
and presidential speeches have gained significant power under the rhetorical presidency.100 It can 
potentially shape congressional discourse in favor of a certain policy action or legislation.  
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Consider Roderick Hart’s research, which scanned more than 10,000 presidential speeches 
between the Harry Truman’s administration and the second term of Ronald Reagan’s 
administration. Hart argues that presidential rhetoric is powerful enough that it “may overpower 
Congress.”101 The rhetorical campaigns that presidents engage in to sway public opinion can 
likely impact and influence Congressional deliberation. An analysis of S.J.Res. 46 must consider 
this relationship between presidential rhetoric and congressional rhetoric. 
 In the Senate’s debate, metaphor emerged as a useful tool to narrate the Iraq crisis. The 
three clusters, FORCE, TIME, and STATUS, worked in tandem to reinforce or extend much of 
what Bush had already said in his speeches leading up to the debate. However, they also worked 
against the passage of the resolution as seen by the speeches of the four Senators studied that 
voted NAY on S.J.Res. 46. These clusters reveal Senators constructed their arguments and the 
way certain entities, like Saddam Hussein, or certain values, like U.S. leadership, were used to 
buttress their support or rejection of S.J. Res. 46. 
     Interestingly, for pro-resolution Senators, the clusters typically operated in a particular 
direction: FORCE  TIME  STATUS. For example, images of a threatening savage, 
categorized under the FORCE cluster, often led to the argument that extensively debating 
S.J.Res. 46 would only hinder the President in neutralizing that threat. All but four Senators 
incorporated the TIME cluster, where they stressed that the exigency surrounding the Iraq crisis 
demanded quick action. Several Senators ended their speech by drawing from the STATUS 
cluster by arguing that if the U.S. did not act swiftly, the nation’s stature abroad would be 
negatively affected. To demonstrate this process, consider Senator Kyl’s speech. He began his 
speech by describing Hussein’s government as “so savage as to flaunt its crimes obviously wants 
to strike terror in the hearts of its citizens.”102 Hussein himself was labeled as a “vicious dictator” 
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and Kyl qualified his threat level as “immediate.”103 Followed by this description, he stated, “A 
great effort was made to make sure Senators had a chance to speak. Some people say, why now? 
Well, because the threat is not going to lessen.”104 He then transitioned into a discussion that 
stressed the urgency of disarming a leader that was killing his own citizens “weekly.”105 Kyl’s 
conclusion cited America’s role in past crises to further justify the resolution. He argued, “It is 
no accident that the oppressed peoples of the world look at us, rather than other countries or the 
U.N., as their ray of hope. That is why we lead, and why we must lead.”106 
 The order of these clusters was also evident in the speeches given by anti-resolution 
Senators. Senator Byrd, for example, started his speech by broadly agreeing with how Hussein 
was being depicted. “There is no disagreement about the character of Saddam Hussein,” Byrd 
stated, “neither on Capitol Hill nor in the minds of every American. The repressive dictator's 
long history of violence and aggression is clear.”107 This FORCE cluster was then followed with 
arguments that contained terms from the TIME cluster. Byrd asked, “Shouldn't the President be 
spending more time with his military advisors in Washington, instead of making campaign 
speeches all over the country? Shouldn’t we be spending more time debating this resolution?”108 
In one particular moment of frustration, Byrd asked, “I have a lot of questions. The American 
people have a lot of questions. We are going to be stampeded and rushed pellmell into a 
showdown right here in the Senate and in the House, and in the next few days. Why all the 
hurry?”109 After going through a list of questions, Byrd began discussing American leadership 
and concluded by claiming, “A hasty invasion can damage our reputation abroad.”110 
 This study supports current understanding of how metaphors aid in justifying war. Their 
ability to literalize images is powerful, so much so that they produce what Ivie labels as 
“subjective illusions.”111 Ivie writes that, “Americans traditionally have exonerated themselves 
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of any guilt for war, hot or cold, by decivilizing the image of their adversaries.”112 The FORCE 
cluster, therefore, serves as an essential cluster that, without it, likely would not have given 
strength to the TIME and STATUS clusters that proceeded. It also likely helped that the Senate 
had defined Hussein in the recent past. Historically, references to Hussein’s barbarous nature can 
be traced back to the 1990s, where Congress made similar accusations of the Iraqi leader. This 
image continued again after the 2001 terrorist attacks as Bush sought Congressional approval to 
invade Iraq, and was reinforced by the Senate in 2002. This FORCE cluster was then lent further 
authority when Senators urged that the President receive speedy congressional approval on 
S.J.Res. 46 to neutralize said adversary, thereby undermining any debate time extensions.  
 The tendency for the metaphoric clusters to appear in a certain order is argumentatively 
significant. Of the texts studied, the structure of the speeches largely followed a particular pattern 
regardless of the speaker’s final vote on the resolution. These clusters were further verified as 
Senators often recycled erroneous information that the Bush administration was reporting; from 
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s “bulletproof evidence” remarks that the CIA knew 
Hussein was conspiring with Al-Qaeda to Secretary of State Colin Powell’s speech advocating 
for the invasion before the United Nations General Assembly. STATUS terms helped disguise 
pro-resolution arguments under a veneer of American greatness and preserving humanitarian 
duties abroad. 
 While each cluster’s persuasive power can be difficult to assess—studies have 
demonstrated that Congressional debate may not persuade Congressmen and women as much as 
external factors like party loyalty or public opinion polls113—they likely helped pro-resolution 
Senators in making their case for war. The use of decivilizing vehicles cemented a foundation 
upon which the Senators could then construct quasi-logical arguments supported by a varied set 
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of terms. Once Hussein’s image had been literalized in the debate, arguing urgency was easy. To 
debate longer would mean a barbarous threat would remain unchecked. That threat, as many 
Senators then argued, would significantly affect America’s status to other countries depending 
on our response.  
 The Senate’s deliberation on S.J.Res. 46, designed to carefully consider the President’s 
request to deploy military troops to invade Iraq, left Americans well-disposed to view Saddam 
Hussein as capable of perpetuating, or at least endorsing, egregious acts of abuse and terror. The 
administration’s rhetorical efforts to link his regime to the horrific attacks carried out by Al-
Qaeda on September 11th, 2001 was made easier as Democratic and Republican Senators 
continued the siren calls made by Bush into their debate. Together, the FORCE, TIME, and 
STATUS clusters produced a narrative that shined a favorable light on the resolution and 
sidelined dissenting voices like Senator Byrd and a handful of other vocal Democratic Senators. 
These clusters host a constellation of terms that Senators employed in their arguments; terms that 
supported claims that America should go to war to defeat a barbaric enemy and engage in that 
war immediately, and all the while continuing the country’s status as a beacon of hope and good.   
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Chapter Four: Conclusion 
The Senate delivered a landmark decision when, following the House of Representatives 
passage of their respective military force resolution, the body decided to equip President George 
W. Bush with the authority to invade Iraq. Their five-day long debate responded to one of the 
most destructive attacks on domestic soil in recent American history. This debate is rich with 
metaphor concerning the status of America, the depiction of an enemy, and the expediency of the 
response. This project, then, explored the rhetorical dimensions of how the Senate considered 
S.J.Res. 46. The speeches from the debate supplied the primary source of textual data for study. 
From this selection, an inductive process took place to identify, document, and analyze salient 
features of those texts. Due to the frequent number of comparisons made in the Senators’ 
speeches, especially toward Saddam Hussein, a metaphoric analysis commended itself. The 
analysis grouped the patterns of metaphor into three clusters: FORCE, TIME, and STATUS. 
These clusters yielded a greater understanding of the debate by illuminating the construction of 
the Senators’ arguments, both regarding the supporting material they used and the order in which 
that support was structured within their remarks. That order progressed from FORCE to TIME to 
STATUS. This chapter reviews this process and discusses the significant conclusions reached in 
order to demonstrate the project’s contributions to rhetorical studies. Limitations of the project 
are noted, and insight is offered for future research seeking to critique Congressional discourse. 
 The thesis took an inductive route when investigating the selected texts. Thus, assessment 
of the debate unfolded as the texts were read and scrutinized. Metaphoric criticism emerged as a 
primary method of analysis. In rhetorical scholarship, the presence of metaphor in U.S. foreign 
policy rhetoric is well known. Robert Ivie discusses how metaphors offer a strategic choice for 
politicians as a tool of persuasion. In his study of Cold War Rhetoric, Ivie outlines how rhetors 
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depicted the U.S.S.R. as an evil entity that demanded resolve.1 In more recent examples, 
Presidents Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush employed metaphors to define the enemy in 
abstract, negative terms during the invasions of Grenada and the Persian Gulf War, respectively.2 
Chapter one provided readers with an orientation to the context behind the Iraq crisis. To 
accomplish this task, the early remarks by President George W. Bush and his administration 
were briefly included. Presidential rhetoric can influence Congressional rhetoric, thus reviewing 
past literature on how U.S. political discourse operates during times of war helped document the 
relationship between the executive and legislative branches.3  
The second chapter presented a descriptive inventory without a pre-set analytical 
framework, where thirty selected texts were analyzed on their own terms. This approach 
permitted a “ground-up” approach so that salient rhetorical theories were considered as the 
project unfolded. Overarching themes were dissected and parsed so as to identify which Senators 
said what and how they supported their arguments. As the inventory developed, the frequent use 
of metaphors and the terms used to comprise those metaphors revealed recurring patterns. While 
each Senator spoke of Hussein differently, viewed the concept of time uniquely, and highlighted 
the importance of America’s stature distinctly, they all employed similar terms to address these 
issues. This led to three metaphoric clusters or groupings of concepts and illuminated the terms 
used to delineate those concepts. FORCE depicted the enemy as brutal, aggressive, and savage. 
The TIME cluster, which referred to both the urgency of the crisis and the length of the debate, 
included terms that both pro-resolution and anti-resolution Senators used. The difference was in 
how these Senators employed the same word to aid their endorsement or rejection of S.J.Res. 46. 
Lastly, the STATUS cluster referred to linguistic choices made by every Senator near the end of 
his speech. Regardless of the Senators’ feelings on S.J.Res. 46, speakers referenced how they 
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believed U.S. leadership would be affected by U.S. responses to the Iraq crisis. Together, these 
clusters wove a narrative that, while difficult to determine absolutely its persuasive power, likely 
contributed to Bush’s rhetorical campaign in persuading the public that invading Iraq was the 
right choice. 
In his research on the 2002 Iraq debate, Thomas Goodnight analyzed Congressional 
speeches, media reports, and presidential addresses in an effort to “open a metapolitics” on the 
reflexivity of presidential and political rhetoric.4 Goodnight explored the discursive relationship 
that existed between the private and public sectors. His concluding remarks are especially 
insightful for the thesis’ conclusion. Goodnight claims that critics of public policy must become 
familiar with the traditional topics of war and peace.5 Political topics, or topoi, are what 
Goodnight explains as “resting places.”6 Their familiarity is vital to public policy studies from a 
rhetorical perspective because of their frequency within political discourse and, as Goodnight 
explains, stem from Aristotle’s work. In a summary of Aristotle’s topics, he states: 
Accessible in historical documents and collective memory, topoi are 
embedded in the practices of expert advisors, elected officials, and publics. 
Advocates work to (1) justify policy from a politically supportable 
standpoint, (2) assess material limitations to intelligence, planning, tactics, 
and strategy, (3) compare the present range of threats, duties, and 
opportunities as similar to those past or emergent and novel, and (4) finds the 
means of public translation of doctrinal, technical, historical, and strategic 
discourses internal to think tanks, public institutions, and other specialized 
communities.7 
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These topoi can inform critics on the process of public policy creation. Since debate is a 
prime forum for public policy analysis, it is within these areas that critics find topics for the 
study and analysis of public policy. Goodnight adds that to grasp fully the rhetorical implications 
of a certain policy, critics must first “locate where political debate takes place, the actors and 
advocates involved, and the strategies employed to justify them.”8 A study of the Senate’s debate 
thus required the identification and documentation of who was speaking, where they were 
speaking, and what rhetorical tactics were used to support their position in that debate. To 
accomplish this, Robert Asen served as a helpful guide in framing the debate. Unlike presidential 
speeches, public hearings and forums typically contain multiple authors and plural audiences. 
Hence, productive public policy critique, from a rhetorical perspective, must consider these 
differences between competing perspectives and arguments through identification of parties and 
interests. Leah Ceccarelli, in her theoretical study of polysemy in rhetorical criticism, refers to 
this process as a “critic-induced polysemy,” where the analyst draws multiple meanings from a 
text that may or may not be accessible or even perceived by certain audiences.9 Robert Asen 
might consider Ceccarelli’s methodological suggestions impractical. On his view, public policy 
debates contain multiple authors and it would be difficult, if not impossible, to determine how 
many audiences read—and conversely, how many do not read—policy texts.10 Rather, Asen 
encourages critics to approach public policy as a diachronic process and not as a collection of 
distinct, individual texts. While this method is far from flawless, it helps summarize and address 
transformative moments that represent the debate as a whole. This project was guided, in part, by 
Asen’s work and it prioritized leadership and seniority. These speakers were more likely to 
receive greater media attention and reflect Asen’s belief that we, as critics, should not feel 
compelled to explore “every potentially relevant utterance.”11 Instead, critics should “cast a 
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sufficiently wide net to elucidate the diverse perspectives forwarded by the multiple authors of 
policy debate and the developments in policy debates over time.”12  
Implications 
A primary objective from the outset was to gain a better understanding of a particular 
policy debate conducted by the Senate. Policy debates, from a rhetorical standpoint, are often 
“under-observed,”13 according to Asen, and their critiques appear infrequent. As seen in the 
literature review in chapter one, not many rhetorical publications focused on policy debates, 
specifically Congress, as their central object of study. Yet, Congressional policy debates often 
carry significant national implications. In his book on the welfare reform legislation debates 
during the 1990s, Asen explored how Senators and Representatives recounted the images of 
poverty in their speeches. He argues that the manner in which politicians represented 
disadvantaged groups—those who need government welfare—had significant implications on 
the legislation they passed.14 Federal representatives’ words matter. They matter because their 
effects may well resonate beyond the walls of the oval office or the halls of Capitol Hill. Thus, 
this thesis seeks to contribute to the current body of scholarship concerning congressional 
rhetoric specifically and policy debates broadly. To expand on this idea, the implications and 
contributions of the study follow. 
The analysis of political debates is important because it can not only shed light on the 
result of a political policy—in this case, the invasion of Iraq—but may also trace the complex 
decision-making process of governmental decisions. Trevor Parry-Giles, in his study of the 2004 
presidential election and the ideological values espoused by the campaigns of both incumbent 
President George W. Bush and then-Senator John Kerry (D-MA), maintains that studying public 
policy can prove advantageous to the public. It “frees citizens from the burden of extensive 
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public-policy knowledge and expertise.”15 This, of course, assumes the public has access to these 
publications. Yet, consider how the first step in publicly disseminating policy research often 
begins at the scholarly level. In his book on the educational policy debates that three school 
boards in Wisconsin regularly hold, Asen illustrates “how ordinary folks build and sustain their 
vision for a community through policy and consequential public decision making.”16 He further 
notes that in a field dominated “by either abstract theory or case studies focused on elite actors 
and agents, I demonstrate how rhetorical theory plays itself out in the humble but high-stakes 
world of local school board deliberations.”17 The legislative process is complex, prohibitively so 
for many citizens seeking to participate in it. Deconstructing the mechanisms of this process can 
begin with a study of the words that our representatives express. 
The Senate’s debate on S.J.Res. 46 was a significant moment in the Bush 
administration’s broader “War on Terror” campaign. Moreover, while the thesis focused on a 
specific policy debate during a specific period, several noteworthy implications exist. First, this 
study supports current understanding of Congressional rhetoric within a public policy 
framework. As observed in the literature review, presidential rhetoric can influence 
congressional discourse. The ideas, phrases, and terms that Presidents employ in their speeches 
are regularly repeated in committee hearings and floor debates.18 It also likely helped that 
President Bush’s approval ratings were at a historic high of 90% following the September 11, 
2001, terrorist attacks.19 Quoting a popular president is not uncommon in the Senate’s debate on 
S.J.Res. 46. All but two Senators—Tom Daschle (D-SD) and Harry Reid (D-NV)—who voted 
for the resolution’s passage cited Bush directly. Twenty-two Senators explicitly mentioned Bush 
and, as Congressional bylaws require, their words were specifically labeled as a quote in the 
Congressional Record. Similarly, Carol Winkler found in her study of Ronald Reagan’s and 
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George H.W. Bush’s speeches on Grenada and Iraq, respectively, that Congress recycled many 
of the same ideas and phrases advanced by these presidents.20 This study does not examine 
George W. Bush’s rhetoric, but to ignore his presence would inadvertently diminish his influence 
on the Senate’s debate. While myriad reasons could explain why Senators chose to quote Bush, 
his high approval ratings and crisis rhetoric may have contributed. 
On the persuasiveness of metaphor in the debate, available data do not reveal with 
certainty how effective metaphors were in influencing any particular behavior. However, the 
analysis conducted in chapter three does indicate that metaphors were employed to support 
several claims. These claims simplified, emphasized, described, and/or exaggerated a particular 
issue. For example, Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein was reduced to abstract notions of brutality and 
savagery. This acted as support for many pro-resolution Senators arguing for S.J.Res. 46’s 
passage. The use of decivilizing metaphors when addressing Hussein was so dominant in the 
debate that anti-resolution Senators also addressed the Iraqi leader’s barbarism. In line with prior 
research, foreign enemies frequently face this process of decivilization.  
The pervasiveness of the decivilizing metaphor made the FORCE cluster a fundamental 
premise many Senators used to justify other arguments in their speeches. Senator Evan Bayh (D-
IN) exemplifies this observation. He began by stating that, “Unfortunately, in dealing with 
Saddam Hussein and the regime of Iraq, we are dealing with a brutal and savage dictator who 
understands one thing, and one thing only: either the threat of force or the use of force.”21 Bayh 
then discussed the Iraqi leader’s “inhumane” and “despotic” behavior for an additional two 
paragraphs. Bayh then argued that such brutality demanded immediate action. He drew from the 
TIME cluster to accomplish this task, stressing the urgency of resolving the Hussein challenge 
by issuing a warning: “I remind my colleagues that in a world of imperfect intelligence--and 
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there will always be imperfect intelligence--if we wait, we run the very real risk of having waited 
too long. We have seen the kind of tragedy to which that can lead.”22 Bayh concluded by 
emphasizing what was at risk if the U.S. did not, a) respond to Hussein and, b) respond quickly. 
He defined that risk as possibly damaging America’s reputation abroad by failing to act. In 
Bayh’s view, “It is only through strong leadership, leadership by the United States, that we will 
preserve the peace, rally our allies, and convince the United Nations to enforce its own 
resolutions. If these efforts avail us not, it is my heartfelt conviction that weapons of mass death 
in the hands of a brutal dictator such as Saddam Hussein represent an unacceptable risk for the 
reputation America holds so dearly and the well-being of the American people.”23  
The direction of the clusters within the Senators’ speeches is particularly interesting. 
With the exception of four Senators who did not draw from the TIME cluster, every text 
followed the format of FORCE  TIME  STATUS. That is, the speeches began with 
metaphors that decivilized24 Hussein and the Iraqi government, continued with an emphasis on 
time—whether it was used to urge a quick vote on S.J.Res. 46 or to advocate for longer time— 
and ended by discussing how an invasion might harm the international perception of America. 
The importance of this conclusion is that it suggests metaphor helped structure several speeches 
in a particular way. It is important to note that while Democratic Senators viewed Hussein as 
highly aggressive, their expression was not as strong as that of the Republicans. The differences 
in Hussein-related metaphors supports this claim. While every Senator drew from the FORCE 
cluster, Democratic speakers were largely more forgiving in their depiction of Hussein. For 
instance, Senator Robert Byrd (D-WV) avoided specifics and contended, “Rather than hearing 
more about Saddam Hussein—we know enough about him and his savage acts—what we need to 
hear from the President are answers to our questions about what he plans to do in Iraq.”25 With 
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respect to the decision process, Democrats and Republicans alike viewed the Iraqi government as 
monolithic and its leader ruthless, but Democrats used fewer metaphors than the Republicans 
regarding Hussein’s ruthlessness. No speaker praised Hussein as a sovereign and rational leader. 
Limitations 
The descriptive inventory and analysis yield one addition to the growing body of work in 
deliberative criticism. Scrutinizing the Senate’s debate forwards an increased understanding of a 
previously understudied set of texts. However, the study was not without limitations. This 
section addresses those constraints and proposes possible directions that future research might 
take. 
Asen recommends that critics should delimit the objects of their study to avoid 
unnecessarily reviewing every relevant text or remark. That recommendation, though, comes 
with restrictions. Having only studied thirty speeches, twenty-eight from the Senate floor and 
two by Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle, the conclusions reached in this thesis do not, 
obviously, represent the entire chamber. Nor do they represent the legislative debate as a whole 
since the U.S. House of Representatives also held a separate debate. Although it may seem that 
thirty speeches from twenty-four Senators are relatively scarce out of a chamber capable of 
hosting 100 Senators, not every Senator participated. In fact, more Senators voted on the 
resolution than debated it. In total, 51 Senators spoke on the resolution and the Congressional 
Record documented 68 speeches. Not including the two statements delivered by Senator Daschle 
outside of the chamber floor, the twenty-eight speeches represents 41% of the texts available. 
The twenty-four unique Senators represents 47% of the total number of speakers who debated 
S.J.Res. 46 on the Senate floor.  
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Policy debates are customarily events without a clear, finite beginning or end. The debate 
on S.J.Res. 46 extended beyond the Congressional chambers; media pundits, state governors, 
private think tanks, and many other sources addressed whether or not we should invade Iraq. 
Twenty-four Senators represent a select group of targeted speakers. There is little question of the 
Senate’s importance in the Iraq crisis, yet they may not have received significant media coverage 
in comparison to the President and his administration. Temporally, some scholars argue that the 
George H. W. Bush administration primed the 2003 decision to invade Iraq during the 1990s.26  
Several Senators even recalled the Persian Gulf War congressional debates in their remarks. The 
scope of the project, thus, was a limitation because it did not include texts from before the 
September 11th, 2001 terrorist attacks—including Bush’s formal declaration that he wanted to 
deploy military force against Iraq—or texts after the debate as Congressional oversight of the 
invasion continued. It is appropriate, then, to orient the thesis as one piece to the broader 
rhetorical history of the 2002-2003 crisis in Iraq.  
 Within the selected texts, only influential speakers were chosen. Their ranking, such as 
leadership positions, and their seniority within their party helped determine the Senators’ 
selection. Whether or not a Senator was up for re-election that year or if they planned to run for 
some other office were not considered. These factors may have contributed to increased media 
attention of a particular speaker, whether or not he had a high ranking or high seniority on the 
day of a speech. Senator Kerry (D-MA), for instance, participated in the debate yet was not 
selected for study despite having been considered in the running for the Democratic nomination 
for President since early 2002.27 
 Lastly, the source for the thirty speeches came from the Congressional Record. That 
choice was not without some limitations. This official journal documents only the remarks of 
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Congress members who wish to be heard and recorded. Many Senators chose to remain silent. 
Thus, the discourse contained in the Congressional Record only involves the voices of a 
privileged or interested segment. This is especially true of the Senate because strict limits listed 
in the Senate Rules can circumscribe debates to a chosen few as determined by party leaders.28 
There is also the reality that legislative debates are not a reliable record of what was actually 
meant on the floor. Several speeches were later clarified by various Senators as the invasion 
decreased in popularity. Former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, who is now running for the 
Democratic Presidential nomination, has retracted certain statements she made during the 
debate.29 Senate Minority Leader Harry Reid spoke against the Iraq invasion later despite having 
voted for it in 2002.30 This thesis did not consider those texts. 
 Realistically, partisanship, constituency pressures, public opinion, and the legislator’s 
ideology are variables that influence the outcome of congressional debates and the arguments 
presented in them. Confirming a Senator’s actual motivations is difficult to achieve through the 
Record. For the purposes of a rhetorical study, the Congressional Record suffices as a collective 
body of official statements. Despite its flaws, the Record serves as the best documentary 
evidence of what members are willing to state for the record.  It is what they openly ascribe their 
reputations to. For example, when federal judges attempt to discern the intentions of the framers 
of a particular law, the canons of statutory construction prefer the Record as the best source of 
those intentions.31  
Future Directions and Conclusion 
This project adds to current research by exploring the ways that metaphor was used as 
supporting material during times of crisis. The power of metaphor is well-known. The trope’s 
capacity to condense complex policy decisions is remarkable. Senators wasted little time in 
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literalizing Saddam Hussein into an inhumane entity. Hussein was evil. Despite the 
appropriateness of metaphoric analysis for this project, it is but one of many ways to analyze the 
Senate’s debate. For instance, Robert Asen observed that the national welfare reform debates of 
the 1990s projected certain groups as different from others. Asen tracked the “rhetorical 
imagination” of how Congressional leaders addressed those in poverty in their speeches, 
presidential depictions of the poor, and other social leaders’ remarks.32 Similarly, future critics 
could approach the debate by focusing not on the arguments made, but on the specific audiences 
that the Senators targeted in their speeches. Other avenues of possibility include analyzing all 68 
speeches by all Senators or expand the scope of one’s project to include both chambers and their 
debates.  
Deliberative criticism provides a foundation for scholars interested in engaging and 
facilitating public policy. There is a significant difference between envisioning the critic as a 
theorist who describes what academic critics can and should do, and envisioning the critic as a 
public citizen or activist.33 The latter discovers practical ways of addressing public issues that in 
turn can offer suggestions that make a noticeable difference in public policy. Ideally, the 
descriptive inventory and analysis of the Senate’s debate—along with many other scholarly 
works on public policy—should be made more accessible. And not only to academic echelons 
but to the public at large.34 Indeed, the word “deliberative” denotes participation. These efforts 
get at the heart of what deliberative criticism should aim to do, to deconstruct the notion of 
accessibility. The importance of this goal is especially evident when considering the idea that 
deliberative criticism usually explores the speeches made by local, state, and federal legislators. 
These political leaders represent a larger audience than only the select few who can obtain and 
read these studies.  
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 The 2003 Iraq invasion evolved into the third longest war in American history.35 While 
many public and private reports have attempted to calculate the damage of this preemptive 
response, its impact has yet to be fully measured. The statements and remarks made by the 
Senators who fought for and against S.J.Res. 46 remain lasting vestiges of this transformative 
policy debate. Debates frequently simplified the multi-faceted operation required of an American 
invasion. This simplification was fueled by comparisons that not only were popular at the time, 
but was aided by the use of metaphor. Research on senatorial rhetoric and public policy 
deliberation presented in this project may serve as a springboard for other critics to expand on, 
criticize, or completely revise. U.S. history informs us that the initiation of another large-scale 
war or invasion is inevitable. It was not too long ago that a Senate chamber presented similar 
arguments against Saddam Hussein during the Persian Gulf War. Thirteen years have passed 
since the 2003 Iraq invasion began, yet the nearly two trillion dollar price tag is still outstanding 
from that commitment. As an institution designed to deliberate and in a world of increasingly 
fragmented terrorist threats, the Senate will almost surely face another decision similar to that of 
Iraq. One hopes that future congressional session will consider what Robert Byrd exclaimed on 
the final day of the debate on October 10th, 2002:  
If the Senate will allow me one more minute, I plead with those people out 
there, I plead with the American people, let your voice be heard. You need to 
be heard. You have a right to be heard. You have questions that should be 
asked and answered. Let the leadership of this Congress know that you don't 
want this resolution rammed through this Congress. The life of your son may 
depend upon it. The life of your daughter may depend on it. I do not believe 
the Senate has given enough time or enough consideration to the question of 
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handing the President unchecked authority to usurp the Constitution and 
declare war on Iraq. I say to the people of America, to those who have 
encouraged other Senators and me to uphold the principles of the 
Constitution: Keep up the fight. Keep fighting for what is right. Let your 
voices be heard.36 
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Appendix A: Selected Texts from the 2002 U.S. Senate’s Debate on S.J.Res. 46  
 
Selection of Senators based on: (1) Leadership Role (2) Seniority 
107th Congress (2001 – 2002) 
October 04, 2002 
Senate Democrat Author & Ranking Senate Republican Author & Ranking 
Senator Robert Byrd (D-WV) 
President Pro Tempore & 2nd in seniority 
Senator John Warner (R-VA) 
16th in seniority 
Senator Carl Levin (D-MI) 
17th in seniority 
Senator George Voinovich (R-OH) 
8th in seniority 
Senator Ron Wyden (D-OR) 
64th in seniority 
Senator Jim Bunning (R-KY) 
81st in seniority 
October 07, 2002 
Senator Robert Byrd (D-WV) 
President Pro Tempore & 2nd in seniority 
Senator Pete Domenici (R-NM) 
8th in seniority 
Senator Max Cleland (D-GA) 
73rd in seniority 
Senator Orrin Hatch (R-UT) 
13th in seniority 
Senator Bill Nelson (D-FL) 
90th in seniority 
Senator Jon Kyl (R-AZ) 
60th in seniority 
October 08, 2002 
Senator Joe Lieberman (D-CT) 
41st in seniority 
Senator John McCain (R-AZ) 
33rd in seniority 
Senator Evan Bayh (D-IN) Senator Larry Craig (R-ID) 
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85th in seniority 45th in seniority 
October 09, 2002 
Senator Robert Byrd (D-WV) 
President Pro Tempore & 2nd in seniority 
Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC) 
7th in seniority 
Senator Harry Reid (D-NV) 
Senate Minority Whip & 34th in seniority 
Senator John McCain (R-AZ) 
33rd in seniority 
Senator Paul Sarbanes (D-MD) 
11th in seniority 
Senator Chuck Hagel (R-NE) 
77th in seniority 
October 10, 2002 
Senator Robert Byrd (D-WV) 
President Pro Tempore & 2nd in seniority 
Senator Trent Lott (R-MS) 
Senate Minority Leader & 38th in seniority 
Senator Tom Daschle (D-SD) 
Senate Majority Leader & 32nd in seniority 
Senator Don Nickles (R-OK)  
Senate Minority Whip & 21st in seniority 
Senator Ted Kennedy (D-MA) 
3rd in seniority 
Senator Jeff Sessions (R-AL) 
75th in seniority 
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